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SHARMILA L. MURTHY*
Legal norms that are translated into quantitative indicators have
the potential to shape behavior, even absent legal penalties, because num-
bers are easy to understand and provide a basis for accountability, com-
parability, and performance benchmarking. In the field of international
environmental law, where legal enforcement options are often limited,
quantitative indicators that facilitate comparison between nations can
be a particularly important way of fostering compliance with emerging
norms. However, quantitative indicators are like double-edged swords:
the very simplicity that enables them to have strong communicative
power often comes at the cost of a complete and accurate understanding
of the problem. This Article analyzes both sides of this proverbial sword
through a case study of the global water, sanitation, and hygiene sector.
Drawing on the environmental law literature on information dis-
closure and the social science and human rights literature on global indi-
cators, I first develop a conceptual framework that examines (1) when
information disclosure is more likely to promote legal compliance, which
is described as a “governance effect;” and (2) how the form of the informa-
tion disclosed, i.e., the choice of certain quantitative indicators, can shape
policy options and alter—or even distort—the meaning of the original
legal norm, which is known as a “knowledge effect.”
I then apply this new approach for studying the dynamic interac-
tion between legal norms and statistics to a case study on global water.
I argue that through quantitative information disclosure, these non-
binding “soft law” declarations to expand access to water, sanitation, and
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hygiene have had a governance effect by influencing international and
national development agendas. I also demonstrate how quantitative
indicators can have unintended knowledge effects with perverse policy
consequences; for example, a person with access to a water tap was con-
sidered to have met one global target even if the water was contaminated
or the tap was broken. Finally, I show how the development of these
statistical tools has been influenced by the conception of water and sani-
tation as human rights. An analysis of this unusual dialogue offers in-
sights to human rights advocates who want to translate their ideas into
numeric terms that policymakers can understand.
This Article makes a unique contribution through its original inter-
disciplinary conceptual framework and comparative analysis of domestic
and international law. It underscores the importance of studying how
quantitative indicators are created to ensure that the knowledge they
impart reflects the original legal norms.
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INTRODUCTION
Legal norms that are translated into quantitative indicators have
the potential to shape behavior, even absent legal penalties, because
numbers are easy to understand and provide a basis for accountability,
comparability, and performance benchmarking.1 Consider, for example,
1 Kevin E. Davis et al., Indicators as a Technology Global Governance, 46 LAW & SOC’Y
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the power of numeric rankings—whether relating to schools, hospitals,
neighborhoods, sports teams, or any other number of topics—to motivate
conduct and spur competition.2
In the field of international environmental law, where legal enforce-
ment options are often limited, quantitative indicators that facilitate
comparison between nations can be a particularly important way of foster-
ing compliance with emerging norms.3 The Environmental Sustainability
Index, for example, is a scorecard that ranks 180 countries on over twenty
parameters.4 The index, which seeks to be an alternative indicator to Gross
Domestic Product and the Human Development Index, pulls information
from numerous databases.5 As Daniel Esty has demonstrated, such rank-
ings and scorecards can have powerful influences on behavior, even
absent legally binding rules.6 Although there is no penalty for receiving
a low score, countries vie to move up the rankings. As with corporate sus-
tainability rankings, the transparent compilation and disclosure of infor-
mation creates pressure to improve performance.7 By their very nature,
rankings spur competition because everyone wants to lead, not lag behind.
Numeric metrics, however, often cannot capture the true complex-
ity of a problem. For example, in a seminal study on water pollution in
the Delaware River published in 1974, Bruce Ackerman and colleagues
described how one indicator, dissolved oxygen, became used as a proxy
REV. 71, 73–74 (2012) (“An indicator is a named collection of rank-ordered data that pur-
ports to represent the past or projected performance of different units. The data are
generated through a process that simplifies raw data about a complex social phenomenon.
The data, in this simplified and processed form, are capable of being used to compare par-
ticular units of analysis (such as countries or institutions or corporations), synchronically
or over time, and to evaluate their performance by reference to one or more standards.”).
2 Id. at 77.
3 DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 87
(2010) (“A norm of international environmental law is a community standard that aims
to guide or influence behavior—traditionally, the behavior of states, but also, more re-
cently, the behavior of institutions and private actors.”); see also Davis et al., supra note
1 (noting that effective global governance requires mechanisms for holding states ac-
countable and statistical indicators provide such a tool); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, THE
SEDUCTIONS OF QUANTIFICATION: MEASURING HUMAN RIGHTS, GENDER VIOLENCE, AND
SEX TRAFFICKING 11 (2016) (noting that “countries that fail to meet targets or are ranked
below others on key indicators are to be ‘shamed’ into improving their records.”).
4 Tanja Srebotnjak & Daniel C. Esty, Measuring Up: Applying the Environmental Sustain-
ability Index, 1 YALE J. INT’L L. 156, 156–68 (2005); Daniel C. Esty, Red Lights to Green
Lights: From 20th Century Environmental Regulation to 21st Century Sustainability, 47
ENV’T L. 1, 56 (2017).
5 Srebotnjak & Esty, supra note 4.
6 Id.; Esty, supra note 4, at 28.
7 Srebotnjak & Esty, supra note 4; Esty, supra note 4, at 56.
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for water quality.8 Because it was easy to calculate with precision, the
quantitative measure became synonymous with overall water quality,
even though it could not predict whether the water was actually suitable
for use.9 With an aura of technocratic intelligence and scientific rigor, the
indicator distorted how lawmakers perceived the problem and ultimately
led to an expensive, but ineffective, pollution control strategy.10
Quantitative indicators are like double-edged swords: the very sim-
plicity that enables them to have strong communicative power can come
at the cost of a complete and accurate understanding of the problem. This
Article analyzes both sides of this proverbial sword through a case study
of the global drinking water, sanitation, and hygiene sector. I discuss how
efforts to quantitatively monitor progress on global water goals have helped
to generate compliance with international declarations but also highlight
how the numeric indicators have provided a somewhat misleading
picture of this progress. A careful study of these global monitoring efforts
reveals both the power of information disclosure, and the challenges and
potential pitfalls of translating legal norms into quantitative indicators.
An estimated 844 million people worldwide lack access to basic
drinking water, and 2.3 billion people lack access to basic sanitation.11
8 B. A. ACKERMAN ET AL., THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: A CASE
STUDY IN THE FAILURE OF MODERN POLICY MAKING 18–19 (1974) (describing how dissolved ox-
ygen is an important measure of river health because it enables fish and other aquatic organ-
isms to breathe, and also allows organic waste to degrade without causing offensive odors).
9 Id. at 18, 25, 30 (noting that dissolved oxygen cannot tell policymakers whether a treat-
ment plant will be able to process water for consumption, nor can it indicate whether the
water is suitable for swimming, fishing or boating).
10 Id. at 30, 136–45.
11 Compare WHO/UNICEF JOINT MONITORING PROGRAMME, PROGRESS ON DRINKING WATER,
SANITATION AND HYGIENE: 2017 UPDATE AND SDG BASELINES 3–4 (2017), http://www.un
water.org/new-publication-whounicef-joint-monitoring-programme-2017-report/ [https://
perma.cc/BJV7-ZAQC] [hereinafter WHO/UNICEF JMP 2017 UPDATE], with WHO/UNICEF
JOINT MONITORING PROGRAMME FOR WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION, PROGRESS ON SANI-
TATION AND DRINKING WATER: 2015 UPDATE AND MDG ASSESSMENT 5, 7 (2015), https://
washdata.org/reports [https://perma.cc/5M86-4DC9] [hereinafter WHO/UNICEF JMP
2015 UPDATE]. The term “basic” access means that the water may not necessarily be safe
to drink and that the sanitation facilities may not safely separate the excreta. In fact,
nearly one-third (29%) of the world’s population does not have access to safely managed
drinking water and nearly two-thirds (61%) does not have access to safely managed sani-
tation. Moreover, because a newer methodology was used to measure water and sanitation
access in the 2017 report (as discussed in Section II.C.2 of this Paper), the estimates for
access to drinking water are more conservative than previously reported. In the 2015
update, for example, it was reported that an estimated 663 million people worldwide lacked
access to drinking water. The more recent figures paint a more accurate and realistic,
albeit grimmer, picture of progress. The 2017 report also provided some information on
hygiene, such as handwashing, but global figures were not available.
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Lack of access to water for basic needs has profound environmental and
public health consequences, leading to higher rates of infectious disease,
worse nutrition, increased child mortality, childhood stunting, less produc-
tivity in the workplace, and inferior quality of life.12 There have been decla-
rations on expanding access to water since the 1970s, but it was not until
the Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”)13 were adopted after the turn
of the century that a large monitoring apparatus developed to measure
global progress on several key development priorities, including expand-
ing access to water, sanitation and hygiene.14 The MDGs expired in 2015,
and a broader set of goals, the Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”),
were adopted by the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly in 2015.15
12 WORLD BANK GRP. & INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT 2015/2016:
DEVELOPMENT GOALS IN AN ERA OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 75, 93 (2016), http://www
.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-monitoring-report [https://perma.cc/2VVK-JHFV]
[hereinafter WORLD BANK GRP.]; Ramnath Subbaraman et al., Off the map: the health
and social implications of being a non-notified slum in India, 24 ENV’T URB. 643, 646, 651,
660–61 (2012), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0956247812456356 [https://
perma.cc/JY8U-Y9JB]; Thomas Clasen et al., Comment on “Household Water Treatment in
Poor Populations: Is There Enough Evidence for Scaling up Now?,” 43 ENV’T. SCI. TECH.
5542, 5542–44 (2009), http://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/es9008147 [https://perma.cc
/3BKY-FSZD]; GUY HOWARD & JAMIE BARTRAM, DOMESTIC WATER QUANTITY, SERVICE
LEVEL AND HEALTH: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2003), http://www.who.int/water_sanitation
_health/diseases/WSH0302exsum.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9PD-HC37]; see generally Dean
Spears et al., Open Defecation and Childhood Stunting in India: An Ecological Analysis of
New Data from 112 Districts, 8 PLOS ONE e73784 (2013), http://journals.plos.org/plosone
/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0073784 [https://perma.cc/V7JC-968E]; Jeffrey S. Hammer
& Dean Spears, Village Sanitation and Children’s Human Capital Evidence from a Ran-
domized Experiment by the Maharashtra Government 2, 4–5 (2013), https://papers.ssrn
.com/abstract=2313535 [https://perma.cc/5EN5-C5YP] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018); Lisa C.
Smith & Lawrence Haddad, Reducing Child Undernutrition: Past Drivers and Priorities
for the Post-MDG Era, 68 WORLD DEV. 180, 182–85 (2015); see also JAMES SALZMAN, DRINK-
ING WATER: A HISTORY 195 (2012) (noting that “researchers estimate that diarrheal
diseases are responsible for the death of one child every eighteen seconds. . . . [I]magine
the outcry to the equivalent of a classroom of children in America dying from waterborne
diseases every six minutes, and an entire elementary school dying every hour.”).
13 UNITED NATIONS, Millenium Development Goals and Beyond 2015 (last visited Jan. 21,
2018), https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/EST92130.pdf [https://perma.cc/YTM3-S5EG].
14 Jamie Bartram et al., Global Monitoring of Water Supply and Sanitation: History,
Methods and Future Challenges, 11 INT’L. J. ENV’T. RES. PUB. HEALTH 8137–65 (2014)
(noting that global monitoring began in the 1930s but became more robust after the
adoption of the MDGs).
15 Among other goals, the SDGs now commit states to achieving by 2030 “universal and
equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all” and “access to adequate and
equitable sanitation and hygiene for all and end open defecation, paying special attention
to the needs of women and girls and those in vulnerable situations.” These are targets
6.1 and 6.2, respectively. G.A. Res. 70/1, at 14–27, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org
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The SDGs have been accompanied by an even more robust monitoring
scheme that relies heavily on quantitative indicators.
The MDGs, SDGs, and other global commitments to expanding ac-
cess to water, sanitation, and hygiene are best described as “soft law,” a
term that generally refers to declarations, statements, standards, and
guidelines that are not enforceable and binding in the same manner as
formal international law but that nevertheless exert influence over the be-
havior of countries and other key actors.16 Soft law instruments can help
to articulate an emerging consensus towards a new norm.17 The definition
of soft law that I adopt here reflects a positivist view of international law,
i.e., that the international rules derive from legitimately constituted polit-
ical processes instead of natural law.18 Soft law instruments have been
especially important in the field of international environmental law, with
U.N. conference resolutions and declarations often serving as the bases
for eventual treaties.19
The first key question that this Article grapples with is whether
these non-binding declarations adopted by the international community on
expanding water, sanitation, and hygiene access are legally meaningful.
Do they help to shape the behavior of nations and thereby result in an ex-
pansion of access to these vital services? A rich literature exists in the fields
of international law and international relations on why nations comply
with international law.20 However, because soft law is not yet formal law,
/content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20Sustainable%20Development
%20web.pdf [https://perma.cc/2H7P-46BN].
16 ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 212 (2007)
(“From a law-making perspective the term [‘soft law’] is simply a convenient description
for a variety of non-legally binding instruments used in contemporary international rela-
tions.”); Dinah Shelton, Soft Law, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 70
(J. D. Armstrong & Jutta Brunée eds., 2009) (“Common forms of soft law include normative
resolutions of international organizations, concluding texts of summit meetings or inter-
national conferences, recommendations of treaty bodies overseeing compliance with treaty
obligations, bilateral or multilateral memoranda of understanding, executive political
agreements, and guidelines or codes of conduct adopted in a variety of contexts.”); Pierre-
Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 420, 434 (1991) (“A ‘soft’ norm can help to define the standards of good behavior cor-
responding to what is nowadays to be expected from a ‘well-governed State’ without having
been necessarily consecrated as an in force customary norm.”).
17 BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 16, at 215; Shelton, supra note 16, at 8.
18 DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 282 (5th ed.
2015); JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 46 (2006); Samuel
Murumba, Foxes and Hedgehogs at the Intersection of Human Rights and Intellectual Prop-
erty, 38 MONASH UNIV. L. REV. 119, 137 (2012).
19 BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 16, at 119; HUNTER ET AL., supra note 18.
20 See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed. ed.
2018] TRANSLATING LEGAL NORMS 391
this Article offers a different perspective on the compliance question by
drawing comparative lessons from the U.S. environmental law literature
on using information disclosure as an alternative to traditional command-
and-control regulation.21 This body of scholarship is an example of the “new
governance” approach to regulation, which recognizes that traditional top-
down rules and adversarial enforcement have, at times, been counterpro-
ductive at regulating private industry.22 Instead, new governance focuses
on the powerful impact that informal rules and legal norms can have on
shaping behavior.23 In some contexts, the term new governance has even
1979) (“It is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of inter-
national law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.”); Harold Hongju Koh,
Why Do Nations Obey International Law? (Book Review), 106 YALE L. J. 2599, 2603 (1997)
(“Like most laws, international rules are rarely enforced, but usually obeyed.”); Kal
Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE
WES. RES. J. INT’L L. 387, 391 (2000) (noting that compliance “refers to a state of conformity
or identify between an actor’s behavior and specified rule.”); DURWOOD ZAELKE ET AL.,
MAKING LAW WORK: ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE & SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 371
(Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 2005) (discussing enforcement approaches to compliance);
Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and
Compliance 19 HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds.,
2002); Oran R. Young, Hitting the Mark, 41 ENV’T SCI. POLICY SUSTAIN. DEV. 20, 21–23,
25 (Oct. 1999).
21 See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar & James Salzman, Making Sense of Information for Environ-
mental Protection, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1350 (June 2008) (proposing a model of information
processes for environmental protection with three phases: “collection and construction of
information,” “use and abuse,” and “access and dissemination.”); Gregg P. Macey, The Archi-
tecture of Ignorance, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1627, 1630–32 (2013) (arguing that our current envi-
ronmental regulatory structure developed at a point in time when data was scarce, but
that we now need to shift a more “data-intensive” approach to regulation that harnesses the
ever-evolving means of gathering information, including through the help of the public);
David B. Spence & Lekha Gopalakrishnan, Bargaining Theory and Regulatory Reform: The
Political Logic of Inefficient Regulation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 599, 597 (2000) (discussing regu-
latory reforms in response to substantive and procedural inefficiency critiques of adminis-
trative efficiency and suggesting another explanation grounded in bargaining theory);
David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational Actor
Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 917 (2001) (discussing EPA’s experiments
with collaborative regulation to help explain why complexity of regulation, and not
rational self-interest, often leads to non-compliance by private actors).
22 See generally Orly Lobel, New Governance As Regulatory Governance, OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF GOVERNANCE 72 (David Levi-Four ed., 2012); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The
Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 342, 347–50 (2004).
23 As Lobel observes, new governance theory posits that “law has a norm-generating ex-
pressive value in addition to its direct control over individuals and corporations.” Lobel,
supra note 22, at 7. The field “explores empirically and calls normatively for improved
regulatory design and a shift from command-and-control regulation to more collaborative
public-private standard setting.” Id. at 14.
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been used interchangeably with soft law, which further suggests the value
in this comparative approach.24 In particular, I rely on scholars such as
Bradley Karkkainen and Daniel Esty who have examined how the disclo-
sure of quantitative information by private and public actors can gener-
ate compliance with environmental norms by enabling peer review and
greater public scrutiny.25
It would be a mistake to assume, however, that information disclo-
sure is necessarily effective in all circumstances. For example, an important
literature exists on the failure of mandated disclosure to help consumers
make effective decisions—which is clear to anyone who has attempted to
read the disclosures provided by credit card companies.26 Rather, the focus
of this paper’s analysis is on how information disclosed as quantitative indi-
cators can have a “governance effect” by shaping the behavior of the disclos-
ing party.27 To understand when such disclosure is likely to be effective,
24 Lobel, supra note 22, at 8.
25 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm, 89 GEO. L. J. 259, 261 (2000); Daniel C. Esty,
Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N. Y. UNIV. L. REV. 115, 138 (2004).
26 See, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW:
THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 651 (2014) (arguing that mandated consumer
disclosure is a useless and ineffective form of regulation); Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Dissecting
the Two-Handed Lawyer: Thinking Versus Action in Business Lawyering, 10 BERKELEY
BUS. L. J. 231, 247 (2014) (noting that information disclosure to individuals would be
effective only if they experienced a rare “epiphany of cathartic rationality,” but that the
use of information as a regulatory device could work “the more ‘macro’ the problem is,”
such as “making an entire market more efficient or transparent”); Michael D. Guttentag,
Evolutionary Analysis in Law: On Disclosure Regulation Symposium on the Society for
Evolutionary Analysis in Law, 48 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 963, 974–76 (2016) (discounting
traditional justifications for disclosure theory and suggesting other ways to evaluate when
disclosure regulation is likely to be effective); Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Dis-
closure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1090–91 (2006) (discussing
the failure of traditional disclosure schemes in the securities las context).
27 This term is widely used in the social science literature on indicators. See Sakiko
Fukuda-Parr et al., The Power of Numbers: A Critical Review of Millennium Development
Goal Targets for Human Development and Human Rights, in THE MDGS, CAPABILITIES
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE POWER OF NUMBERS TO SHAPE AGENDAS 1–13, (Sakiko Fukuda-
Parr & Alicia Ely Yamin eds., 2015); Davis et al., supra note 1, at 92; MERRY, supra note
3; Davis, et al., Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance, 46 L. SOC. REV. 71, 92
(2012). A review of the legal literature suggests that the term governance effect has been
most widely used in studies on corporate global governance. See, e.g., Larry Cata Backer,
From Institutional Misalignments to Socially Sustainable Governance: The Guiding Prin-
ciples for Implementation of the United Nations’ “Protect, Respect and Remedy” and the
Construction of Inter-Systemic Global Governance, 25 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOB. BUS. & DEV.
L. J. 69, 71 (2012). To the extent the term governance effect has been used in the environ-
mental literature, it has been primarily in studies of private environmental governance.
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I comparatively analyze the U.S. Toxics Release Inventory (“TRI”), a semi-
nal case study in the environmental literature on alternatives to command-
and-control regulation,28 and the global water monitoring system.29
The second key issue that this Article examines is how the form of
the information disclosed, i.e., the choice of certain quantitative indicators,
can shape the subsequent policy options and alter—or even distort—the
meaning of the original legal norm.30 I describe this phenomenon as a
“knowledge effect.”31 My ideas were influenced by the social science and
legal literature on the use of global indicators to measure human rights,
including scholarship by Sally Engle Merry, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Alicia
Ely Yamin, and Margaret Satterthwaite.32 I also draw on the work of
William Boyd,33 who highlights the importance of understanding how
knowledge practices shape environmental regulatory options, and on the
environmental law literature debating the merits of cost-benefit analysis,
including the work of Lisa Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman,34 as well
as that of Richard Revesz and Michael Livermore.35
See, e.g., Steph Tai, Private Environmental Governance and the Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship, 29 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 111, 111 (2016).
28 See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 25; see also MICHAEL E. KRAFT ET AL., COMING CLEAN:
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 65 (2011).
29 As discussed in Part II, these efforts have largely been led by the Joint Monitoring Pro-
gram, a joint initiative of the World Health Organization and UNICEF.
30 Fukuda-Parr et al., supra note 27, at 2; see also Steve D. Charman & Vanessa Quiroz,
Blind Sequential Lineup Administration Reduces Both False Identifications and Confidence
in Those False Identifications, 40 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 477, 477 (2016); Cass R. Sunstein,
Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 962, 962 (2005).
31 Fukuda-Parr et al., supra note 27, at 2. A review of the legal literature indicates that
this term has been used primarily in studies on law and behavior. See, e.g., Charman &
Quiroz, supra note 30; Sunstein, supra note 30.
32 MERRY, supra note 3; SAKIKO FUKUDA-PARR & ALICIA ELY YAMIN, THE MDGS, CAPA-
BILITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE POWER OF NUMBERS TO SHAPE AGENDAS (2015); Ann
Janette Rosga & Margaret L. Satterthwaite, The Trust in Indicators: Measuring Human
Rights, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 253, 256 (2009).
33 William Boyd, Ways of Seeing in Environmental Law: How Deforestation Became an
Object of Climate Governance, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 843, 856, 916 (2010).
34 FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERY-
THING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 35 (2004); Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing
the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1553,
1553 (2002); Lisa Heinzerling, Risking It All Meador Lecture Series 2004–2005: Risk and
the Law, 57 ALA. L. REV. 103, 107 (2005); Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of Statistical People
Comment, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 189 (2000).
35 RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 17 (2008); Michael A.
Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based Environmental Standards, 89
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Part I of this Article develops this two-pronged approach for study-
ing the dynamic interaction between legal norms and statistics. By identify-
ing factors that mediate the governance effects and knowledge effects of
quantitative indicators, the interdisciplinary conceptual model provides
a useful framework for analyzing when information disclosure can promote
compliance with non-binding legal norms. In Part II of this Article, I apply
this framework to a detailed case study on the global drinking water,
sanitation, and hygiene sector.
My argument in Part II on the role of global water indicators in
shaping legal compliance with soft law declarations proceeds in three
parts. First, I argue that although international commitments to expanding
water, sanitation, and hygiene access are not enforceable as international
law, they are influential in shaping international and national development
agendas through the power of statistics, i.e., through information that is
disclosed as numbers. Through a comparative analysis with the TRI, I
analyze three factors that mediate the governance effect of the global
water declarations: the communicative power of a simple quantitative
indicator; the capacity and willingness of the target actor to change its
behavior; and the ability of external stakeholders to influence the target
actor, which is impacted by the power dynamics between the two groups.36
Second, given the potential power of quantitative indicators to shape
the behavior of disclosing parties, even absent binding legal penalties, I
argue that it is imperative to understand exactly how legal norms are
translated into statistics in order to avoid policy distortion. Through a de-
tailed analysis of global efforts to monitor and measure progress on the
global water goals, I demonstrate how quantitative indicators can take on
a life of their own and thereby have knowledge effects that can inadver-
tently redefine the original normative goals. For example, when a legal
norm is translated into a number, the “calculability”37 of that metric is pri-
oritized, which means that harder to quantify aspects of the problem can
be neglected. Moreover, because information can be difficult to gather,
N. Y. UNIV. L. REV. 1184, 1184 (2014); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Inter-
est Groups and Environmental Policy: Inconsistent Positions and Missed Opportunities,
45 ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (2015).
36 See infra Part II.
37 I adopt the term “calculability” from Boyd, who employs it to describe techniques that
facilitate the quantification, simplification and comparison of that problem. Boyd, supra
note 33, at 902–03, n.250 (citing THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT
OF OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE (1995); Clark A. Miller, New Civic Epistemol-
ogies of Quantification: Making Sense of Indicators of Local and Global Sustainability, 30
SCI. TECH. HUM. VALUES 403, 403–32 (2005, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177
/0162243904273448 [https://perma.cc/ZH69-PMSK].
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quantitative indicators may be structured around data that already exists
and/or may be limited by the experiences of those tasked with developing
them—concepts referred to as “data inertia” and “expertise inertia,” re-
spectively.38 For instance, when countries agreed in the 2000s to reduce by
half the number of individuals “without sustainable access to safe drinking
water,”39 they used a quantitative indicator to measure progress that con-
sidered neither sustainability nor safety.40 Thus, a person with access to
a water tap was considered to have met the target even if the water was
contaminated or the tap was broken.41
Finally, despite the emphasis on creating quantifiable indicators in
the global water sector, I demonstrate how the development of these statis-
tical tools has been influenced by the conception of water and sanitation
as human rights.42 This unusual dialogue between the statistical and
human rights communities has been facilitated by broader trends, such as
the rise of human rights indicators,43 and by specific efforts within the
water community.44 The inclusion of a human rights perspective into the
global water monitoring apparatus may enhance state recognition of the
38 MERRY, supra note 3, at 6–7.
39 This is from Target 7.C of the Millennium Development Goal in the U.N. Millennium
Project, which derived from the Millenium Declaration adopted by states in 2000. UNITED
NATIONS, supra note 13.
40 WHO/UNICEF JMP 2015 UPDATE, supra note 11; WHO/UNICEF, METHODOLOGICAL NOTE:
PROPOSED INDICATOR FRAMEWORK FOR MONITORING SDG TARGETS ON DRINKING WATER, SANI-
TATION, HYGIENE AND WASTEWATER (2015), http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health
/monitoring/coverage/wash-post-2015-rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJ24-KE9C] [hereinafter
WHO/UNICEF, METHODOLOGICAL NOTE]; Bartram et al., supra note 14, at 8141–55; infra
Section II.C.
41 Bartram et al., supra note 14; Malcolm Langford & Inga Winkler, Muddying the Water?
Assessing Target-based Approaches in Development Cooperation for Water and Sanitation,
in FUKUDA-PARR & YAMIN, supra note 32, at 144–45.
42 WHO/UNICEF, METHODOLOGICAL NOTE, supra note 40; IAEG-SDGS, GOAL 6 ENSURE
AVAILABILITY AND SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF WATER AND SANITATION FOR ALL 2, 5, 17
(2016), http://unstats.un.org/sdgs/files/metadata-compilation/Metadata-Goal-6.pdf [https://
perma.cc/337G-H4G2]. This right is alternatively described as the human right to water
and sanitation, the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation or the human rights
to water and sanitation. These semantics are symbolically important as I discuss in a prior
work, Sharmila Murthy, The Human Right(s) to Water and Sanitation: History, Meaning
and the Controversy over Privatization, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 89 (2013). In this Article,
I use the term “human right to safe drinking water and sanitation” when referring to official
documents and “rights to water and sanitation” when discussing the concepts generally.
43 See, e.g., U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS INDI-
CATORS: A GUIDE TO MEASUREMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION, at III (2012), http://www
.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Human_rights_indicators_en.pdf [https://perma.cc
/X7FK-T769].
44 See, e.g., WHO/UNICEF JMP 2015 UPDATE, supra note 11.
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rights to water and sanitation under international law. However, because
not all aspects of human rights can easily be quantified, I urge caution
in understanding the potential knowledge effects that could alter the
meaning of the rights. This analysis offers insights to human rights ad-
vocates who want to understand how to translate their ideas into nu-
meric terms that policymakers can understand. It also suggests that the
quantitative indicators being developed to measure the global water
targets may have greater influence on policymaking and norm develop-
ment than the politically negotiated text of the U.N. General Assembly
declarations that gave rise to them.
Through a comparative and interdisciplinary analysis, this Article
provides a new approach for analyzing how quantitative indicators can
promote legal compliance, even with soft law norms. The analysis under-
scores the importance of studying how quantitative indicators are created
to ensure that the knowledge they impart reflects the original legal goals.
I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE PROMISES AND
PERILS OF USING QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS TO PROMOTE
LEGAL COMPLIANCE
A. Governance Effects
By creating standards that benchmark performance, quantitative
indicators have the potential to influence behavior, even absent legal
penalties.45 With seeming objectivity, numbers provide a basis for ac-
countability and comparability.46 Indicators have enormous communica-
tive power because they can simplify a complex idea into a number.47
Quantification has been described as a powerful “social technology” due
to its potential to shape law and public policy.48 In our information age,49
the interest in indicators has coincided with a more general “audit explo-
sion”50 and a desire for “evidence-based governance.”51
45 Fukuda-Parr et al., supra note 27, at 2; MERRY, supra note 3, at 11.
46 FUKUDA-PARR & YAMIN, supra note 32.
47 Fukuda-Parr et al., supra note 27, at 2, 7.
48 PORTER, supra note 37, at 58. A growing body of literature explores “indicators as a
technology of global governance.” See, e.g., Davis et al., supra note 1, at 28.
49 Esty, supra note 25.
50 Rosga & Satterthwaite, supra note 32, at 256 (quoting economic analyst Michael Power).
51 MERRY, supra note 3, at 10 (defining “evidence-based governance” as “a broad range
of regulatory strategies that rely on empiricism, quantitative knowledge as the basis for
decision making and problem solving through benchmarking”).
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The TRI is a well-studied example from the environmental litera-
ture that showcases how quantitative indicators can shape behavior and
thereby promote compliance with new legal norms.52 After the devastat-
ing releases of chemicals at the Union Carbide plants in Bhopal, India
and in Institute, Virginia in the 1980s, the American public demanded
greater access to information about environmental hazards.53 As a result,
Congress created the TRI to require that certain U.S. facilities publicly
report releases of listed toxic chemicals above a threshold amount.54
By simply requiring the disclosure of information about pollution
discharges, the TRI has had a governance effect and spurred corrective
action by industry.55 Between 1988 and 1998, TRI was credited with a
forty-six percent decrease in the releases of toxic chemicals.56 Declines
have continued but at a more moderate pace, with an overall decrease of
twenty-four percent between 2005 and 2015.57 As a result, TRI has been
52 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The provisions regarding the Toxics
Release Inventory are found in § 313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right
to Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
53 See Bradley C. Karkkainen et al., After Backyard Environmentalism: Toward a Per-
formance-Based Regime of Environmental Regulation, 44 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 690, 695–96
(2000); KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28, at 56–61.
54 See Esty, supra note 4, at 28; Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 286; Karkkainen et al., supra
note 53, at 695–96; William F. Pedersen, Regulation and Information Disclosure: Parallel
Universes and Beyond, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 163 (2001); JAMES T. HAMILTON, REGU-
LATION THROUGH REVELATION: THE ORIGIN, POLITICS, AND IMPACTS OF THE TOXICS RELEASE
INVENTORY PROGRAM (2005); KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28, at 56–60; David W. Case, The
Role of Information in Environmental Justice American Bar Association Section of Environ-
ment, Energy, and Resources Symposium, 81 MISS. L. J. 701, 732 (2011); Kim Fortun, From
Bhopal to the Informating of Environmentalism: Risk Communication in Historical Perspec-
tive, 19 LANDSCAPES EXPOSURE KNOWLEDGE ILLNESS MOD. ENV’T 283, 288 (2004).
55 Some corporations even took preemptive actions because they were concerned about
the detrimental publicity that would likely result from the disclosure of information
through TRI. For instance, in 1998 Monsanto pledged to cut toxic air emissions by over
ninety percent within five years, and achieved this goal ahead of schedule after spending
$100 million. KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28, at 53; Mary Graham & Catherine Miller, Dis-
closure of Toxic Releases in the United States, in INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION: ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 307 Theo J. N. M. de
Bruijn & Vicki Norberg-Bohm eds., 2005); Cynthia Giles, Next Generation Compliance,
in NEXT GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 6 (LeRoy Paddock
& Jessica Wentz eds., 2014).
56 Graham & Miller, supra note 55, at 307. See also KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28, at 54
(“For example, Invista, a facility in New Hanover County, North Carolina, reduced its
toxic releases from 25.6 million pounds in 1988 to 3.6 million in 1989—a drop of roughly
85 percent in only one year’s time.”).
57 EPA, 2015 TRI NATIONAL ANALYSIS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, at ii (2015), https://www
.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-01/documents/tri_na_2015_executive_summary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HC37-56RM].
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hailed as a new model of environmental regulation by policymakers, schol-
ars, and environmental groups for its overall impact.58 Closer inspection,
however, reveals that TRI has actually had inconsistent results.59 For
example, between 2009 and 2010, there was a sixteen percent increase
in total disposal and other releases.60 Moreover, when the TRI data is
disaggregated, it becomes clear that not all facilities have actually
reduced their toxic releases. Some facilities have made huge progress in
reducing their chemical releases while others actually have increased the
amount of toxics they generate and release into the environment.61
TRI’s disclosure-based approach addresses some of the inherent
challenges of environmental regulation, such as the need for greater in-
formation,62 but it may not necessarily be the best way to reduce environ-
mental hazards and incentivize corporate action in a domestic context
where other enforcement options exist.63 However, it is beyond the scope
of this Article to engage in a debate over the merits of traditional versus
alternative forms of regulation, such as market-based or new governance
options.64 Rather, I suggest that the lessons that can be learned from TRI
58 Pedersen, supra note 54, at 163; KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28, at 54; Karkkainen et al.,
supra note 53, at 696.
59 KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28, at 153; Graham & Miller, supra note 55, at 313.
60 EPA, 2010 TRI NATIONAL ANALYSIS OVERVIEW 6–7 (2010), https://www.epa.gov/sites/pro
duction/files/documents/2010_national_analysis_overview_document.pdf [https://perma
.cc/5BW5-LCM4]; EPA, 2012 TRI NATIONAL ANALYSIS OVERVIEW 7–8 (2014), https://www
.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-01/documents/complete_2012_tri_na_overview_docu
ment.pdf) [https://perma.cc/8C29-77UZ] (showing an increase in toxic chemical releases).
61 KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28, at 154. But see Graham & Miller, supra note 55, at 315
(noting that some of the increases in the mid-1990s were due to a rapidly growing economy
and that toxic waste generation increased at a slower rate than manufacturing production).
62 Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 263–68 (“Conventional approaches to environmental
regulation are . . . limited by the capacity of regulators to acquire the information
necessary to set regulatory standards and keep pace with rapid changes in knowledge,
technology, and environmental conditions. . . . Given these daunting information barriers,
it is not surprising that so few pollutants have actually come under regulatory control,
despite the proliferation of regulatory statutes and offices to administer them, and de-
spite the investment of millions of dollars and thousands of person-years in the effort to
set and justify standards.”); Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of
Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53
DUKE L.J. 1619, 1619 (2003) (arguing that “one of the most significant problems facing
environmental law is the dearth of scientific information available to assess the impact
of industrial activities on public health and the environment”).
63 David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law
and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 387 (2005) (noting “that disclosure
strategies are imperfect substitutes for direct legal controls on environmental conduct”).
64 See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 22; Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accounta-
bility, and Regulatory Metrics, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1741 (2008); Ronan Kennedy,
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are valuable for the international environmental law context, where it is
rare for even binding treaties to penalize parties for non-compliance and
where compliance is often incentivized through the transparent disclo-
sure of information.65
The Paris Agreement on climate change is a case in point.66 All
parties committed to establishing emissions targets in the form of “na-
tionally determined contributions” and to adopting “domestic mitigation
measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions.”67
The Paris Agreement does not have economic or military penalties for
non-compliance. Instead, participating nations agree to report on their own
progress and to be subject to a form of external review, with the expecta-
tion that the transparent disclosure of information will foster adherence
to the treaty terms.68 Although the global commitments to expanding access
to water, sanitation, and hygiene are soft law and not treaty-based obli-
gations, the global monitoring schemes that monitor their progress have
the same goal of incentivizing compliance through information disclosure.
With the goal of extrapolating lessons for the global water sector,
I studied the literature on the TRI to understand why it was effective in
some instances at changing corporate behavior and enhancing public
Rethinking Reflexive Law for the Information Age: Hybrid and Flexible Regulation by Dis-
closure, 7 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 124, 124 (2016); Sarah E. Light & Eric W.
Orts, Parallels in Public and Private Environmental Governance, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. &
ADMIN. L. 1, 7–10 (2015).
65 For example, neither the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas, nor the U.N. Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, nor the U.N. Convention on Non-Navigational Uses
of International Watercourses contain provisions that would allow economic or military
sanctions to be imposed on a country for non-compliance with the treaty terms. However,
all emphasize the importance of cooperation in exchanging information. The Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is a notable exception because it
does permit the imposition of trade related penalties. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 18;
see generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 200, May 21, 1997,
U.N.T.S. 3, 6; U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 1, *2, *6, *9; United
Nations Convention on Non Navigational Uses of International Watercourses art. 9,
April 11, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. A/51/869, 6. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer is a notable exception because it does permit the imposition of
trade related penalties. But see 26 I.L.M. 1522, 34 (1987).
66 Paris Agreement art. 13, Apr. 22, 2016, T.I.A.S. 16-1104, http://unfccc.int/files/essential
_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc
/HJG6-SKNV]. See also Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement,
25 REV. EUR. COMP. INT’L ENVTL. L. 142, 142 (2016); Daniel Bodansky, The Paris Climate
Change Agreement: A New Hope?, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 288, 288 (2016).
67 Paris Agreement, supra note 66, art. 4(2).
68 Id. art. 13.
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knowledge of environmental risks. Drawing on the work of Karkkainen,
Kraft et al., and others,69 I synthesized this body of scholarship and dis-
tilled out three key factors that appear to mediate the governance effect
of TRI’s disclosure scheme.
The first important factor that I identified from the TRI literature
is that disclosed information has stronger communicative power when it
is framed as a simple quantitative indicator that promotes comparison.
The concept of “equivalence,” which I borrow from Boyd, helps to explain
why.70 Equivalence refers to those technical practices that allow seem-
ingly different activities to be standardized into one system and thus be
treated equivalently for comparative purposes.71 The TRI metric promotes
equivalence by enabling facilities of different sizes, working in different
industries, and located in different parts of the country, to be measured
and ranked across one indicator.72 By translating complex goals on envi-
ronmental risk and performance into a simple quantitative metric, TRI
generates information that is more accessible to the public, media, regula-
tors, and the facilities themselves.73
The second influential factor is the ability and willingness of the
target actor to change its behavior. The TRI has a stronger governance
effect when reporting facilities have the capacity and desire to improve
and adapt.74 Prior to the implementation of TRI, many facilities were not
even aware of their own toxic releases.75 They then discovered that the
information they had to report to TRI enabled them to manage their opera-
tions better, consistent with the adage “you manage what you measure.”76
For these facilities, TRI promoted a continuous-learning, continuous-
improvement dynamic that propelled them to voluntarily enhance their
69 See Karkkainen et al., supra note 53; KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28; Case, supra note 54;
Fortun, supra note 54.
70 Boyd, supra note 33, at 856.
71 For example, in a case study on how deforestation became an object of international
climate governance, Boyd uses equivalence to explain how the concept of “global warming
potential” allowed different gases in diverse sectors to be tracked in one system, which
in turn facilitated the integration of tropical forests into the carbon compliance system.
See id. at 912.
72 See generally id. at 856 (applying the principle of equivalence to TRI).
73 42 U.S.C. § 11023; KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28, at 60–61; Karkkainen, supra note 25, at
285 (noting that much of the information that EPA normally gathers is not easily com-
prehensible, leading to the agency to describe itself as “data-rich but information-poor”).
74 KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28, at 42–47; Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 289–90, 295.
75 Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 297.
76 Id. at 298–99 (noting that one “firm had never set internal pollution prevention goals be-
cause ‘[w]e never had the information we needed to know if progress was being made.’ ”).
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own environmental self-monitoring.77 However, the selective impact of
TRI on changing behavior aligned with other corporate goals.78 It also
suggests that certain facilities have the capacity to use the information
more productively.79
The third factor that influences the governance effect of disclosed
information is the ability of external stakeholders to influence the target
actor, which is impacted by the power dynamics between the groups. TRI
has been more effective at spurring corporate change when markets, regu-
lators, and the public have been able to use the disclosed information to
alter the reporting facility’s actions.80 In some instances, TRI data has
influenced the perceptions of corporate boards, institutional investors,
the stock market,81 as well as the firm’s own employees and customers.82
Regulators at the national, state, and local levels have used the data
generated on toxic releases to identify regulatory gaps and priorities83 and,
in some instances, to enact additional laws to regulate the facilities.84
Civil society groups have been able to transform the TRI information into
more user-friendly data.85 This in turn has helped communities bring
77 Id. at 302, 305–09, 330 (discussing how TRI has fostered some additional peer-based
benchmarking and monitoring efforts, such as the Responsible Care program launched
by the organization now known as the American Chemistry Council); KRAFT ET AL., supra
note 28, at 55.
78 KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28, at 170.
79 Id. at 153–76; Graham & Miller, supra note 55, at 313.
80 Graham & Miller, supra note 55, at 311.
81 Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 299; id. at 323–24; KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28, at 42.
82 Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 325–28 (suggesting that workers might demand wage
premiums for risking exposure to perceived workplace hazards and that a facility may
use its “superior” performance on the TRI to build its public image).
83 For example, Congress amended the Clean Air Act in 1990 to strengthen provisions on
hazardous air pollutants after early rounds of data from the TRI revealed that much
larger volumes of these pollutants were being released into the air. Id. at 310–12; KRAFT
ET AL., supra note 28, at 45, 55.
84 KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28, at 65 (discussing New Jersey’s Worker and Community
Right to Known Act and Massachusetts’ Toxic Use Reduction Act).
85 The EPA’s National Analysis on TRI data explicitly invites users to conduct their own
analysis of the publicly available TRI data. EPA, supra note 57, at 3. For example, the
Scorecard, which was originally created by Environmental Defense Fund and is now run
by Green Media Toolshed, combines data from the TRI with other information on the
potential health hazards of toxic chemicals. Pollution Locator, SCORECARD (last visited
Jan. 21, 2018), http://scorecard.goodguide.com/env-releases/us-map.tcl [https://perma.cc
/66UR-8DY6]; Fortun, supra note 54, at 292 (noting that when the Scorecard was first
launched, Chemical Week described it as the “Internet Bomb” because of its potential
impact on the reputation of chemical companies, while Greenpeace lauded it as the “gold
standard” of environmental information systems).
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pressure on polluters, such as through boycotts, adverse publicity, and
lawsuits.86 The data has also revealed inequities in exposure that raise
environmental justice concerns.87 However, the fact that these disparities
continue to exist highlights the unequal power dynamics that limit the
potential for a strong governance effect.88 Although the impact of any par-
ticular stakeholder depends on the given situation, Karkkainen argues
that the “underlying genius” of the TRI is that it allows monitoring and
benchmarking by multiple actors.89
The three factors identified through this synthesis of the TRI
literature—the simplicity of the metric, the capacity and desire of the
disclosing actor to change its behavior, and the ability of external stake-
holders to influence the target actor—provide a useful framework for
analyzing the governance effect of other disclosure schemes, such as the
global water, sanitation, and hygiene monitoring efforts that are the focus
of this Article’s case study. However, TRI also illustrates the potential
distorting impact of relying solely on numeric indicators to achieve a
complex goal like reducing environmental risk. The next section on knowl-
edge effects explains why and identifies factors that influence the ability
of a legal norm to be accurately translated into a quantitative indicator.
B. Knowledge Effects
Quantitative indicators may take on a life of their own and repre-
sent more (or less) than originally intended, and thereby have a knowl-
edge effect that inadvertently redefines the original normative goal and
distorts the subsequent policy options.90 For example, TRI data is often
86 Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 316–23; KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28, at 44; Kim Fortun et
al., Pushback: Critical data designers and pollution politics, BIG DATA & SOCIETY 1 (2016).
87 KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28, at 10; Case, supra note 54, at 733–34; RUBIN PATTERSON,
GREENING AFRICANA STUDIES: LINKING ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES WITH TRANSFORMING
BLACK EXPERIENCES 128 (2015), http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=2&
sid=ffaf9521-0dd0-4c8e-9fdf-f226e30b2311%40sessionmgr4008&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlP
WNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmUmc2NvcGU9c2l0ZQ%3d
%3d#AN=910206&db=nlebk [https://perma.cc/J93B-VAP4] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
88 Kraft et al. underscore this point when they note that “somewhat contrary to the expec-
tations that policymakers had for the TRI program, relatively few people and community
groups have made much direct use of the TRI data; this is particularly the case in later
years of the program’ s operation.” KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28, at 55.
89 Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 329.
90 Fukuda-Parr et al., supra note 27. SAKIKO FUKUDA-PARR, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT GOAL
SETTING AS A POLICY TOOL FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: INTENDED AND UNINTENDED CON-
SEQUENCES 2, 6 (2013), http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper108.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6UVH-ELTM].
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used as a proxy for community environmental health91 and for corporate
environmental performance92—but the metric is in fact a poor predictor
of both normative goals. TRI simply requires facilities to disclose pounds
of toxins released, not the actual risk associated with these toxins.93 Al-
though the chosen metric of pounds of toxics released is theoretically
calculable, facilities are only required to report estimates and most do
not even have reliable ways to conduct the measurements.94 In other
words, the indicator was chosen in part because of what was technically
feasible and what data was readily available.95
The list of chemicals covered by the TRI is only a fraction of the
chemicals currently used.96 We know very little about the vast majority
of chemicals and the EPA does not have the needed expertise or staff
power to conduct appropriate tests.97 Not all chemicals are equally toxic98
and the health risk depends on the medium through which the toxin is
released, i.e., through air, water, or land.99 Because the reporting require-
ments only apply to certain industry sectors and businesses of a certain
91 For example, when President Bill Clinton signed into law updates to the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, he explained that the act provides “an
innovative approach to protecting public health and the environment by ensuring that
communities are informed about the toxic chemicals being released into the air, land, and
water by manufacturing facilities.” 60 FED. REG. 41791 (Aug. 8, 1995), available at https://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-title42/html/USCODE-2010-title42-chap116.htm
[https://perma.cc/6TVL-KWQC]. Similarly, the EPA asserts that “Since the creation of
the TRI Program, the information collected and presented has provided a way for citizens
to better understand possible sources of pollution in their communities.” U.S. EPA, LEARN
ABOUT THE TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY US EPA (2013), https://www.epa.gov/toxics-re
lease-inventory-tri-program/learn-about-toxics-release-inventory [https://perma.cc/92VL
-D8MM] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
92 See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 305–06.
93 KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28, at 63, 66–67; Pedersen, supra note 54, at 173.
94 KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28, at 61.
95 Id. at 61.
96 Id. at 61, 68 (noting that the TRI list has grown from about 300 to about 650 chemicals,
but industrial facilities use tens of thousands of chemicals and new ones are constantly
being developed; even those that are deemed to be “safe” have not necessarily been
thoroughly tested for toxicity).
97 Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 263–65; Pedersen, supra note 54, at 179–81.
98 Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 264–65; Pollution Locator, supra note 85; Pedersen,
supra note 54, at 171–72; KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28, at 63.
99 Pedersen, supra note 54, at 170–71; Graham & Miller, supra note 55, at 318–19; KRAFT
ET AL., supra note 28, at 67 (noting that air pollution dissipates more rapidly than other
mediums, but many people are nonetheless exposed via inhalation; that certain toxins
remain in water, enabling exposure through ingestion or dermal contact; and that al-
though less people tend to be exposed through land pollution, contaminants can remain
in the ground for a long time).
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size,100 a huge amount of toxins continue to be used101 and released into
the environment.102 The information disclosed may not even reflect true
improvements due to “paper changes”103 and inaccurate estimations.104
Moreover, the TRI metric is focused on pounds of toxins released, so the
data is necessarily skewed towards larger facilities; percentage reduc-
tions would in fact be a more accurate assessment of performance.105
Given that a metric like the TRI is a poor proxy for normative goals
on environmental risk exposure and corporate environmental performance,
is the quantitative indicator useful at all? I agree with most scholars who
have studied the issue and concluded that the answer is yes.106 Although
TRI is not perfect, it has created positive governance effects, at least in cer-
tain circumstances as discussed in the prior section. Moreover, as long as
the inherent limitations are understood, then the disclosed information can
be taken with the appropriate grain of salt. In other words, we should not
throw out the proverbial baby with the bath water. However, we need to
understand why it is difficult to translate complicated legal norms into
numbers so that we can address these barriers, improve the statistics, and,
where appropriate, develop other more descriptive sources of information.
The development of statistical indicators necessarily prioritizes
those factors that can easily be quantified and demotes more complicated,
harder to quantify aspects.107 The reliance on statistics can turn an exer-
cise of judgment and subjectivity into a technical exercise, devoid of politi-
cal context.108 As Ackerman et al. observes, a quantitative indicator “seems
100 42 U.S. Code § 11023; 40 CFR § 372.65; Case, supra note 54, at 736; Pedersen, supra
note 54, at 165–70.
101 Pedersen, supra note 54, at 173; Graham & Miller, supra note 55, at 326.
102 KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28, at 56; Graham & Miller, supra note 55, at 308.
103 These “paper changes” are due to changes in estimations or because a facility may decide
to start reporting the on-site recycling of a chemical as “in-process recovery,” which is not
reportable to TRI. Graham & Miller, supra note 55, at 317; KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28,
at 63, 69.
104 KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28, at 61.
105 Id. at 89.
106 For example, Karkkainen argues that despite TRI’s limitations, it is nevertheless ef-
fective because it shifts the burden of producing information to the polluting facilities,
which helps to overcome the “information bottleneck” that EPA faces in all its environ-
mental regulatory efforts. Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 263. See also Graham & Miller,
supra note 55; KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28; Archon Fung & Dara O’Rourke, Reinventing
Environmental Regulation from the Grassroots Up: Explaining and Expanding the Success
of the Toxics Release Inventory, 25 ENVTL. MANAGE. 115, 116 (2000); Pedersen, supra note
54, at 207–08.
107 Bartram et al., supra note 14, at 8157.
108 Rosga & Satterthwaite, supra note 32, at 258.
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to promise to the lay decision maker a comprehensive assay of the problem
to be confronted,” when in fact, it represents only one dimension of a much
more complex issue.109 The veil of objectivism that surrounds statistical
indicators camouflages political assumptions that go into the process.110
“Quantification is seductive,” Merry argues, because “numbers convey an
aura of objective truth and scientific authority despite the extensive inter-
pretive work that goes into their construction.”111
Examples abound with respect to this kind of knowledge effect
distortion, even outside the environmental field.112 Consider the pervasive
use of unemployment figures. According to the U.S. Department of Labor,
“people are classified as unemployed if they do not have a job, have actively
looked for work in the prior 4 weeks, and are currently available for
work.”113 Unemployment is often used as a proxy for the overall health of
the economy because it is simple to report and understand. But, in fact, it
is a very limited indicator. If people stop looking for work, they are not
captured in unemployment statistics.114 People who drive for Uber or work
at McDonald’s might have highly variable incomes, depending on the
amount of work they are able to get in a given week; such income volatility
is not captured in unemployment. Moreover, unemployment is an aggre-
gate figure, representing an average. If the data was disaggregated, it
would reveal high variability among communities based on geography,
race, and social class.
Similarly, the long-standing debate over the value of cost-benefit
analyses in regulatory decision-making has underscored that issues that
are difficult to measure can easily be ignored. As Justice Stevens has ob-
served, the application of cost-benefit analysis “is particularly controver-
sial in the environmental context in which a regulation’s financial costs
are often more obvious and easier to quantify than its environmental
benefits.”115 Heinzerling and Ackerman have argued that cost-benefit
109 ACKERMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 28, 30.
110 MERRY, supra note 3, at 19–20.
111 Id. at 1.
112 SETH STEPHENS-DAVIDOWITZ, EVERYBODY LIES: BIG DATA, NEW DATA, AND WHAT THE
INTERNET CAN TELL US ABOUT WHO WE REALLY ARE 252–56 (2017) (discussing a variety
of examples where we overemphasize things that are measurable, such as educational
test scores and the results of pedometers, that are really proxies for other things that are
less measurable, such as the development of critical thinking and overall fitness).
113 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, HOW THE GOVERNMENT MEA-
SURES UNEMPLOYMENT, https://www.bls.gov/cps/cps_htgm.htm#unemployed [https://perma
.cc/N7ES-ASUK] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
114 Id.
115 Entergy Corporation v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009) (Stevens, dissenting)
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analysis is fundamentally flawed because it requires the creation of arti-
ficial prices for all relevant health and environmental impacts, which
cannot readily be reduced to numbers.116 They discuss absurd examples
of such economic reductionism, such as a study showing that states would
save money by encouraging their citizens to smoke more because they
would not have to pay for long-term nursing care and related costs.117 They
further note that prior successful environmental protection actions, such
as the removal of lead from gasoline, would never have been undertaken
had cost-benefit analysis been applied because the benefits would not
have been appropriately quantified.118
Livermore and Revesz, however, challenge this conventional wisdom
by suggesting that in certain circumstances, cost-benefit analysis can in
fact lead to more environmentally stringent outcomes than more seem-
ingly protective criteria, such as health-based standards.119 Because envi-
ronmentalists initially absented themselves from the development of
cost-benefit analyses, the methodologies became biased against regula-
tion and “environmentalist opposition to cost-benefit analysis became a
self-fulfilling prophecy.”120 More recently, environmentalists are engaging
in the development of cost-benefit methodologies because they recognize
that the approach can enhance environmental protection.121
(noting that the EPA’s cost-benefit calculation for water intake regulations only included
the value of commercially or recreationally harvested fish, which meant that 98.2% of the
aquatic life was excluded from the analysis because the value of those species could not
easily be monetized). See also Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of
OIRA, 33 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1097, 1105 (2006) (critiquing EPA’s rule on cooling water
intake structures at existing power plants for its failure to monetize benefits of all
impacted species); Heinzerling , supra note 34, at 113 (noting that even when an agency
recognizes that unquantifiable benefits exist, they are often ignored when the focus is on
a “numerical bottom line,” such as when “a federal court overturned the EPA’s ban on
asbestos partly because it concluded that the agency could not rely in any significant way
on unquantified benefits in justifying the ban.”).
116 Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 34, at 1563–64.
117 Id. at 1553–54. Interestingly, they also laud the Toxics Release Inventory as an effec-
tive “right to know” alternative that does not rely on cost-benefit analysis—even though
this disclosure scheme also suffers from some of the same flaws. Id. at 1582–83.
118 Frank Ackerman et al., Applying Cost-Benefit to Past Decisions: Was Environmental
Protection Ever a Good Idea?, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 155, 156 (2005).
119 Livermore & Revesz, supra note 35 (arguing that “contrary to the commonly accepted
view, [National Ambient Air Quality Standards under the Clean Air Act] have generally
been set at levels that are less stringent than those that would result from the appli-
cation of cost-benefit analysis”).
120 Livermore & Revesz, supra note 35, at 6.
121 Id. at 5.
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While I recognize the inherent challenges in translating a complex
legal norm into a number, I suggest that it is important to understand
how quantitative indicators are constructed and deployed so that the
methodologies can be improved and the resulting statistics can be placed
in their proper context. Several terms of art drawn from the environmen-
tal law and social science literature provide a helpful vocabulary for de-
scribing the process and limitations of translating legal norms into
quantitative indicators. I draw again on Boyd’s work, adopting the term
“calculability,” which he uses to describe techniques that facilitate the
quantification, simplification and comparison of that problem.122
I also build on the social science literature examining the role of
indicators in global governance.123 In particular, Merry highlights two
related phenomenon that underscore the limitations of calculability.124
Because information can be difficult to gather, quantitative indicators may
be structured around data that already exists instead of measuring the
intended goal, and thus suffer from “data inertia.”125 Quantitative indica-
tors purport to convey the objective truth, but because the data is never
complete and may not measure exactly what is intended, the result can
be misleading.126 In addition, “expertise inertia” refers to the fact that
statistical indicators are inherently limited by the experiences and skills
of those charged with developing them.127 These terms—calculability,
data inertia and expertise inertia—create a language that helps explain
the challenges of translating legal norms into numeric indicators.
Problems of calculability, data inertia, and expertise inertia should
also be understood as social justice issues.128 As Merry observes, techno-
cratic processes often mask the political and normative nature of decision-
making, allowing statistical knowledge to fly “under the radar of social
and political analysis as a form of power.”129 For instance, as noted earlier,
civil society groups have been able to use data from the TRI to highlight
environmental justice concerns because counties that have a higher per-
centage of black and other minority residents are more likely to live in
122 Boyd, supra note 33, at 856, 916.
123 See also MERRY, supra note 3, at 14–15; Davis et al., supra note 1, at 79–80; FUKUDA-
PARR & YAMIN, supra note 32, at 1, 4; Rosga & Satterthwaite, supra note 32, at 255.
124 MERRY, supra note 3, at 6–7 (explaining the limitations of “data inertia” and “expertise
inertia” on calculability).
125 Id. at 7.
126 Id. at 5.
127 Id. at 6.
128 I return to this theme in Section II.D, when I discuss how human rights have influ-
enced the development of global water indicators.
129 MERRY, supra note 3, at 5.
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communities exposed to higher numbers of acute and chronic toxic re-
leases.130 However, the information would be more accurate at predicting
environmental risk if the TRI metric included all chemicals used by the
facilities and provided information on actual toxic exposure. Given that
industry has already pushed back on efforts to expand the list of chemi-
cals that must be reported to the TRI,131 attempts to improve the TRI
indicator would no doubt face stiff resistance. The failure to change the
metric reflects, directly or indirectly, power dynamics in society and the
political prioritization of issues.132
I am not suggesting that all complex issues can—or should—be
translated into numeric terms because not all topics can be adequately
measured. Rather, I am making a more subtle argument: when a quanti-
tative indicator is developed, it is critical to examine why the metric was
constructed in a particular way and why certain data gaps exist. It is also
important to engage in meaningful efforts to improve a statistical indica-
tor so that it better captures the complexity of a problem. However,
because numbers can never portray the full story, it is equally important
that other complementary forms of research and knowledge are gener-
ated so that a complete picture can emerge.
By identifying the factors that influence both the governance effects
and knowledge effects of quantitative indicators, this interdisciplinary
conceptual framework provides a novel way to examine when information
disclosure is likely to promote legal compliance. This approach is partic-
ularly useful to the study of international environmental law because a
large monitoring scheme has developed to quantitatively measure progress
on global commitments to expanding access to water, sanitation, and
hygiene. The next section describes the relevant international legal declara-
tions and then uses the conceptual framework to examine the governance
and knowledge effects of these global indicators.
II. CASE STUDY ON GLOBAL WATER, SANITATION, AND HYGIENE
A. Brief History of Global Water Goals
Over the last half century, access to intrastate water has become an
object of global environmental governance. The start of the international
130 PATTERSON, supra note 87, at 128.
131 Pedersen, supra note 54, at 165; KRAFT ET AL., supra note 28.
132 See also Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 34, at 1573–74 (noting that because cost-
benefit analysis focuses on aggregate benefits and costs, “it tends to ignore, and therefore
has the effect of reinforcing, patterns of economic and social inequality”).
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environmental movement is often traced to the 1972 Stockholm Confer-
ence on the Human Environment, whose declaration briefly mentioned
water as among the natural resources of the earth that must be safe-
guarded.133 However, it was the 1977 Action Plan of the U.N. Water
Conference in Mar Del Plata that galvanized attention on a variety of
water issues. With respect to community water supply, the U.N. confer-
ence declared that “[a]ll peoples, whatever their stage of development
and their social and economic conditions, have the right to have access
to drinking water in quantities and of a quality equal to their basic
needs.”134 The 1980s were declared the International Drinking Water
Supply and Sanitation Decade and concrete targets were established:
100% access for urban water, 80% access for urban sanitation, and 50%
access for rural water and sanitation.135 Any achievement towards these
targets was negated by population growth, so when states met at the
1990 Global Consultation on Safe Water and Sanitation in New Delhi,
they declared that universal access for water and sanitation should be
achieved by 2000.136 This commitment to universal access to safe water
and sanitation services was reaffirmed in Agenda 21, the comprehensive
action plan that accompanied the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development.137
The turn of the century heralded a new approach to international
development, one that prioritized measurable goals that could be moni-
tored through quantitative indicators.138 In 2000, U.N. member states
adopted the Millennium Declaration, which did not commit to universal
water access but instead resolved “to halve the proportion of people who
133 See generally G.A. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48.14.Rev.1.
134 U.N. WATER CONFERENCE—RESOLUTIONS, at 1, U.N. Sales No. E.77.II.A.12 (March
1977), http://ielrc.org/content/e7701.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2WD-TWG3].
135 G.A. Res. 35/18, at ¶ 4 (Nov. 10, 1980), http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/35/a35r18e
.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WPP-2J2B]; B.Z. Diamant, Assessment and Evaluation of the
International Water Decade, 112 J. R. SOC. HEALTH 183, 183–84 (1992).
136 New Delhi Statement, Global Consultation on Safe Water and Sanitation, 2–3, U.N. Doc
A/C.2/45/3 (Oct. 11, 1990), http://ielrc.org/content/e9005.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DUT-4WW9].
137 United Nations Conference on Env’t & Dev., Agenda 21, art. 6.12 (June 14, 1992), http://
www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/Agenda21.pdf [https://perma.cc
/MMC6-C288].
138 Statement by Mark Suzman, Managing Director, International Policy, Programs &
Advocacy, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, to High Level Dialogue on Health in the
Post-2015 Development Agenda (Mar. 5, 2013), https://www.gatesfoundation.org/Media
-Center/Speeches/2013/03/High-Level-Dialogue-on-Health-in-the-Post-2015-Development
-Agenda [https://perma.cc/5BKP-R6AM] [hereinafter Suzman Statement Mar. 2013].
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are unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water” by 2015.139 This shift
away from universal water access reflected the international community’s
embrace of more realistic time-bound goals that could be measured.
The goals in the Millennium Declaration were ultimately trans-
lated into the MDGs,140 through a technical process that was criticized by
civil society for being non-transparent and non-participatory.141 The
resulting goals committed states to “halv[ing] by 2015, the proportion of
the population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and
basic sanitation.”142 This target differed from the original wording of the
Millennium Declaration in several ways. The Millennium Declaration
only addressed water, but sanitation was added to the MDG target in
2002.143 After much debate, the reference to “affordability” in the Declara-
tion was deleted, the phrase “sustainable access” was added to the MDG
target, and the description of water as “safe” in the Declaration was
maintained.144 However, as will be discussed in Section II.C, the actual
indicators used to measure progress with this MDG target did not con-
sider sustainability, safety, or affordability. The Joint Monitoring Pro-
gram for Water Supply and Sanitation (“JMP”), which the World Health
Organization and UNICEF created in 1990, was tasked with developing
indicators to monitor progress towards the MDGs.145
139 G.A. Res. 55/22, at 4 (Sept. 18, 2000); Langford & Winkler, supra note 41, at 145 (de-
scribing this as a “normative regression”).
140 The targets identified in the Millennium Declaration were merged with the Interna-
tional Development Goals that had been developed by the Development Assistance
Committee of the OECD to prioritize funding for overseas development. David Hulme,
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): A Short History of the World’s Biggest Promise
12–16 (Brooks World Poverty Inst., Working Paper No. 100, Sept. 2009), http://papers
.ssrn.com/abstract=1544271 [https://perma.cc/F83W-CTPV] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018);
John W. McArthur, The Origins of the Millennium Development Goals, XXXIV SAIS REV.
5, 6 (2014) (“The lack of transparency in the formulation of the MDGs was one of their
shortcomings, for a group of staff members from the U.N., International Monetary Fund,
World Bank, and OECD were responsible for the drafting process without any broader
participation, especially from civil society.”).
141 See, e.g., Ved Nanda, The Journey from the Millennium Development Goals to the Sus-
tainable Development Goals, 44 DENV. J. INT’L POL’Y 389, 398 (2016).
142 U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. AFFAIRS, OFFICIAL LIST OF MDG INDICATORS, http://mdgs.un.org
/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/OfficialList.htm [https://perma.cc/GC77-G2CP]
(last visted Oct. 24, 2017).
143 Bartram et al., supra note 14, at 8142.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 8138, 8142 (noting that international monitoring of drinking water and sanitation
began in the 1930s under the League of Nations but became more robust under the JMP).
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In 2010, the MDG target for water was met five years ahead of
schedule, but there was less cause for celebration than might appear at
first glance.146 At that point in time, there were still approximately 780
million individuals without access to improved drinking water.147 As dis-
cussed below, however, these figures were underestimates because the
statistical methodology did not capture whether the water was safe,
available when needed, easily accessible, or affordable.148 In addition, by
the time the MDGs expired in 2015, sanitation remained one of the most
off-track MDGs, with the target having been missed by almost 700
million people.149
The year 2010 was also when the U.N. General Assembly and
Human Rights Council adopted resolutions recognizing a human right
to safe drinking water and sanitation.150 The right, which derives princi-
pally from the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, “entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessi-
ble and affordable water for personal and domestic uses.”151 As discussed
in Section II.D, this recognition fueled greater attention to the MDG
water targets by the human rights community and provided another
language for describing the shortcomings of the indicators.152
The MDGs expired in 2015 and there was significant debate over
what would define the so-called post-2015 development agenda.153 At the
2012 Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development, states adopted an
outcome document that included a call to develop SDGs.154 Ultimately,
146 WHO/UNICEF JOINT MONITORING PROGRAMME FOR WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION,
JMP REPORT: PROGRESS ON DRINKING WATER AND SANITATION: 2012 UPDATE Looking
Forward Looking Back, Foreword (2012), https://washdata.org/reports?reports%5B0%5D
=date%3A2012 [https://perma.cc/Y3QG-2ZZW] [hereinafter WHO/UNICEF JMP 2012
UPDATE].
147 Id.
148 WHO/UNICEF JMP 2015 UPDATE, supra note 11, at 5.
149 Id. at 4.
150 G.A. Res 64/292, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/PV.108, at 2 (July 28, 2010); Human Rights
Council Res. 15/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/9, at 1 (Oct. 6, 2010).
151 Gen. Comment No. 14: Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ESCOR, Comm. on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights on Its 22nd Session, E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter
Gen. Comment No. 14]; Gen. Comment No. 15: The Right to Water, Comm. on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights on Its 29th Session, E/C.12/2002/22, ¶ 2 (Jan. 20, 2003) [here-
inafter Gen. Comment No. 15].
152 Gen. Comment No. 15, supra note 151.
153 G.A. Res. 66/288, ¶ 249 (July 27, 2012), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc
.asp?symbol=%20A/RES/66/238 [https://perma.cc/6H9M-UXF3].
154 Id. ¶ 81.
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in 2015, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution entitled “Trans-
forming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” which
set forth the 17 goals and 169 targets that now comprise the SDGs.155 The
declaration also reaffirms state “commitments regarding the human right
to safe drinking water and sanitation.”156
Goal 6 of the SDGs seeks to “ensure availability and sustainable
management of water and sanitation for all.”157 In Targets 6.1 and 6.2 of
the SDGs, states commit to achieving by 2030 “universal and equitable
access to safe and affordable drinking water for all” and “access to ade-
quate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all and end[ing] open defe-
cation, paying special attention to the needs of women and girls and those
in vulnerable situations.”158 As discussed more in Section II.D, although
the actual goal and targets are not framed in human rights terms, the
JMP, which is responsible for developing the statistical indicators for the
water, sanitation and hygiene targets, has explicitly embraced a human
rights interpretation of these targets.159 In addition, SDG 6 also encom-
passes process-oriented “means of implementation” targets, with states
pledging in Target 6.b to “support and strengthen the participation of local
communities in improving water and sanitation management.”160 Several
other SDGs are also relevant to the water targets, including the commit-
ment to “reduce inequality within and among countries”161 and to “ensure
all men and women, in particular the poor and vulnerable, have equal
rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services. . . .”162
To measure and compare country progress, enhance accountability,
and inform policy, several U.N. agencies163 are developing quantitative
155 G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 15, ¶ 7.
156 Id. ¶ 7.
157 Id. at 14.
158 Id. at 18.
159 IAEG-SDGS, supra note 42; WHO/UNICEF: METHODOLOGICAL NOTE, supra note 40,
at 29, 81. As discussed in Section II.D, the current U.N. Special Rapporteur on the
human rights to water and sanitation has criticized the JMP for not including a human
rights perspective even more explicitly in their 2017 progress report. Open Letter from
Léo Heller, U.N. Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking water and
sanitation, to the WHO-UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for WASH, ¶3 (July 28,
2017), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Water/OpenLetter_WHO_UNICEF_WASH
.pdf [https://perma.cc/VSP5-8ZVH].
160 G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 15, ¶ 3.
161 Id. at 21.
162 Id. at 15.
163 All of these targets under Goal 6 are being managed under the umbrella of U.N.
Water. The drinking water and sanitation access targets will continue to be monitored
by the Joint Monitoring Program on UNICEF and the World Health Organization, which
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indicators through a complex bureaucratic process that is being coordi-
nated by the Inter-Agency Expert Group on SDG Indicators, a new initia-
tive under the auspices of the U.N. Statistical Commission.164
B. Governance Effects of Global Water Goals
In this Article, I argue that current efforts to achieve global water,
sanitation, and hygiene goals will have a governance effect because the
elaborate monitoring apparatus that has been developed to measure prog-
ress with the SDGs will result in the disclosure of information. I am not
suggesting that the SDGs will actually be effective in achieving their
lofty ambitions, but rather that the very process of compiling statistics
about each country’s progress and creating comparative rankings will
shape state behavior.165 Just as the disclosure of information through the
TRI has had a governance effect, I argue that the data generated from
the quantitative indicators developed for the precursor MDGs, and now
the SDGs, have had and will continue to have a governance effect.
The MDGs focused international efforts on a handful of time-
bound targets that could be measured and thereby provide accountability.166
The eight poverty alleviation and environmental sustainability goals167
was created in 1991. The process-oriented “means of implementation” targets relating to
assistance and participation will be monitored by U.N. Water Global Analysis and Assess-
ment for Sanitation and Drinking Water (“GLAAS”), in collaboration with OECD and
U.N. Environment. The other targets relating to water quality, wastewater management,
water resource management, etc. are being coordinated by a new initiative known as
GEMI under the U.N. Water umbrella. See U.N. WATER, MONITORING WATER AND SANI-
TATION IN THE 2030 AGENDA FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE
7 (2016), http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/file/Monitoring%20Water %20
and%20Sanitation%20in%20the%202030%20Agenda.pdf [https://perma.cc/32HC-XS6S].
164 U.N. Dep’t of Econ. and Soc. Affairs, IAEG-SDGs—SDG Indicators, https://unstats.un
.org/sdgs/iaeg-sdgs/metadata-compilation/ [https://perma.cc/5S6W-2HCY] (last visited
Jan. 21, 2018).
165 See, e.g., MERRY, supra note 3, at 5 (“Quantitative information influences aid to de-
veloping countries, investment decisions, choices of tourist destinations, and many other
decisions. A country with poor indicators for the rule of law, human rights compliance,
and trafficking invites international intervention and management.”).
166 John Gerard Ruggie, The United Nations and Globalization: Patterns and Limits of
Institutional Adaptation, 9 GLOB. GOV. 301, 307 (2003); Philip Alston, Ships Passing in
the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights and Development Debate seen through
the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals, 27 HUM. RIGHTS Q. 755, 756 (2005).
167 The eight goals were: (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal
primary education; (3) promote gender equality and empower women; (4) reduce child
mortality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases;
(7) ensure environmental sustainability; and (8) develop a global partnership for develop-
ment. UNITED NATIONS, About the MDGs, supra note 13.
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were supplemented by twenty-one targets, which in turn were measured
by sixty quantitative indicators.168 Experts within the U.N. system created
the goals, targets and indicators.169 As time-bound targets, they commanded
stronger political attention to poverty,170 influenced national development
strategies,171 and galvanized international aid efforts.172 Many developing
countries integrated MDG priorities into their budgets and adopted
schemes to accelerate progress towards the goals.173 The MDGs aligned
efforts across member states, U.N. agencies, international financial in-
stitutions, NGOs, and foundations,174 and also fostered coordination of
global partnerships, such as the Global Fund.175 At the same time, the
168 OFFICIAL LIST OF MDG INDICATORS, supra note 142.
169 The targets identified in the Millennium Declaration were merged with the International
Development Goals that had been developed by the Development Assistance Committee
of the OECD to prioritize funding for overseas development. See Hulme, supra note 140,
at 12–16; McArthur, supra note 140, at 6.
170 U.N. Secretary-General, The Report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the
Post-2015 Development Agenda, Letters from the Co-Chairs (May 30, 2013), https://www
.un.org/sg/sites/www.un.org.sg/files/files/HLP_P2015_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2TQ
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lection.html [https://perma.cc/WWR3-DFZE].
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DELIVER 2030 (Feb. 15, 2016), http://deliver2030.org/?p=6767 [https://perma.cc/F9HU
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Development Goals, THE BLOG OF BILL GATES (Sept. 18, 2013), https://www.gatesnotes
.com/Development/MDGs-Dream-with-a-Deadline [https://perma.cc/BP86-9H5B]; Tom
Murphy, How Bill Gates stopped worrying and learned to love the MDGs, HUMANOSPHERE
(2013), http://www.humanosphere.org/basics/2013/09/how-bill-gates-stopped-worrying
-and-learned-to-love-the-mdgs/ [https://perma.cc/GV4X-F8ZQ] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018);
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We Want for All: Report to the Secretary-General 5 (June 2012), http://www.un.org/en/de
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Jeffrey D. Sachs, High stakes at the UN on the Sustainable Development Goals, 382 THE
LANCET 1001–02 (2013); Ruggie, supra note 166, at 306.
173 Suzman Statement Mar. 2013, supra note 138; Clare Melamed, Post-2015: The Road
Ahead 4 (2012), https:// www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion
-files/7873.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q8Q-KD6J].
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very strength of the MDGs—their narrow scope and focus on measurable
outcomes—was also cause for severe criticism, as discussed in greater de-
tail in Section II.C on Knowledge Effects.176
The MDGs have generally been seen as a very successful endeavor,
which is why the international community decided to build on this prior
effort when adopting the SDGs.177 However, upon closer inspection, the
actual impact of the MDGs was mixed and uneven.178 According to
economist and U.N. advisor Jeffrey Sachs, “[t]he MDGs have been the
most successful global undertaking in history to coordinate action to fight
extreme poverty in all its forms: income, hunger, disease, lack of school-
ing, and deficient basic infrastructure.”179 Sachs’s claims largely hold true
in certain areas, but not in others. The World Bank, for example, ob-
serves that the MDGs helped to reduce income poverty, but the global
goals did not lead to improvements in other areas, such as access to
quality education or basic health services.180 In some respects, the dra-
matic decline in poverty rates can be attributed to the rapid economic
growth in Asia, especially in China and India.181 Empirical studies have
attempted to assess whether the MDGs actually made a difference or
whether the improvements would have occurred regardless.182 The studies
found mixed results, with positive improvements in only some categories,
such as under-five mortality, maternal mortality, primary school enroll-
ment, and some diseases like tuberculosis.183 In some instances, the data
suggested that the positive impacts commenced with MDG efforts, while
in others, the efforts began prior to 2000 but progress accelerated after
the MDGs were adopted.184
The three factors identified in the first half of the conceptual frame-
work from a review of the TRI literature—simplicity of the indicator,
capacity of the target actor, and influence of external stakeholders—
provide a useful way to analyze the governance impact of the MDGs.185
ing-Group-on-Sustainable-Development-Goals [https://perma.cc/AQ9K-ZU6C] [herein-
after Suzman Statement Dec. 2013].
176 See, e.g., FUKUDA-PARR & YAMIN, supra note 32 (providing case studies from many
different sectors critiquing the MDG’s approach).
177 Suzman Statement Mar. 2013, supra note 138.
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181 Id. at 2, 94.
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First, the information disclosed was in the form of quantitative indicators
that could be easily understood and compared.186 The MDGs were not the
first goals to be articulated by the U.N. but they were different from prior
efforts because they were concise, easy to communicate, measurable, and
focused on outcomes.187 In the international development arena, the MDGs
underscored the importance of data for promoting accountability, making
wise investment decisions, and enhancing research.188 The business
adage, “you manage what you measure,” also began to drive the interna-
tional development agenda.189
The concept of equivalence was also at the core of these efforts.
The same statistics were gathered regardless of whether a person lived
in a rural village or a modern city, or whether she had to walk five miles
to gather water from a well or had a tap inside her home. The quantita-
tive indicators presented a “way of seeing” that allowed seemingly differ-
ent things to be compared on the same spectrum.190 This comparison, in
turn, facilitated the kind of information-sharing that could shape state
behavior, even absent binding international law.191 As a result of the
monitoring, countries were ranked according to individual indicators and
then the indicators were merged together to create composite indicators.
The governance effect resulted in part because no country wanted to be
listed at the bottom of the rankings.192 Standardized reporting across
regions enabled comparisons and peer-learning among countries, which
“unwittingly encouraged weaker performers to improve their perfor-
mance by generating a spirit of positive competition.”193 In this respect,
the MDGs exercised the “power of numbers” because they relied upon
numerical indicators to measure progress and incentivize behavior.194
In the water sector, countries and regions were scored according
to whether they had achieved progress on expanding access to water and
186 See Suzman Statement Dec. 2013, supra note 175.
187 Fukuda-Parr et al., supra note 27, at 9. In contrast, more comprehensive efforts, such
as Agenda 21, which resulted from the 2002 Rio Conference on Sustainable Development
and which led to the creation of the Commission on Sustainable Development, failed
largely because it was difficult to track and measure progress. See U.N. Secretary-
General, Lessons learned from the Commission on Sustainable Development: Report of
the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/67-757, 2–3 (February 26, 2013).
188 U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, supra note 171, at xi.
189 WHO/UNICEF JMP 2017 UPDATE, supra note 11, at 13.
190 Boyd, supra note 33, at 856.
191 U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, supra note 171, at 62.
192 See FUKUDA-PARR, supra note 90.
193 U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, supra note 171, at 62.
194 Fukuda-Parr et al., supra note 27, at 2; Suzman Statement Dec. 2013, supra note 175.
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sanitation, with percentages assigned to the proportion of each country’s
urban and rural populations that had access to these basic services.195
These quantitative metrics then allowed the countries and regions to be
classified into one of four categories: “met target;” “good progress;” “mod-
erate progress;” and “limited or no progress.”196 Detailed reports also
provided more nuanced ranking information, which motivated govern-
ments and attracted international attention.197 For example, India met
the water target and made “moderate progress” on the sanitation target.198
However, home to more than half of world’s population who defecate in
the open,199 India also earned an ignominious reputation as the “global
capital of open defecation.”200 As a result, the country launched a “Clean
India Movement,” including an effort to construct more toilets and end open
defecation.201 In fact, sanitation has now gained significantly more atten-
tion due to the abysmal global progress on the MDG sanitation targets.202
The second factor that mediated the potential governance effect
was the ability and capacity of the target actors. The MDG targets were
more easily attained when the targets aligned with existing efforts within
the country to address an issue, which reflected the willingness and
ability of that country to address a problem.203 Significant regional varia-
tion in progress existed, with targets more easily met by countries that
were already benefitting from economic progress, such as China and
India.204 In contrast, countries with high fertility rates and rapid popula-
tion growth that were predominantly natural resource-based economies
or struggling with conflict had less capacity to meet the MDG targets.205
195 WHO/UNICEF JMP 2015 UPDATE, supra note 11, at 56.
196 Id.
197 U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, supra note 171, at 62.
198 WHO/UNICEF JMP 2015 UPDATE, supra note 11, at 64.
199 Id. at 32–33.
200 India global capital of open defecation: NGO, DECCAN HERALD (Nov. 18, 2013), http://
www.deccanherald.com/content/369696/india-global-capital-open-defecation.html [https://
perma.cc/DS5R-P6R4] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
201 Govt sets up clean India fund to receive contributions for building toilets, BUSINESS
STANDARD (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/govt
-sets-up-clean-india-fund-to-receive-contributions-for-building-toilets-114112501458
_1.html [https://perma.cc/9SNF-XKN2] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018); Avishek D. Dastidar
& Liz Mathew, PM plans social media challenge to clean India, THE INDIAN EXPRESS
(Oct. 2, 2014), http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/pm-plans-social-media
-challenge-to-clean-india/ [https://perma.cc/CL9F-TQXY].
202 Langford & Winkler, supra note 41.
203 Fukuda-Parr et al., supra note 27, at 4.
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The architects of the MDGs intended the goals to be global tar-
gets. However, they were almost immediately translated into national
targets, which mean that they did not take into account the existing capac-
ity of states.206 Because the baseline year was set in the year 1990, some
countries had already made significant progress towards the goals by the
time they were officially adopted in the 2000s.207 As a result, countries
that had in fact made significant progress in relative terms were described
as “off-track.”
For example, rather than laud Africa for its successes,208 the region
was instead described as the most “off-track” region because barely three
of the eight MDGs had been achieved.209 Countries in sub-Saharan African,
in particular, are comparatively poorer, suffer from more extreme pov-
erty, have more difficulty translating economic growth into improved per
capita incomes, and have larger amounts of sovereign debt.210 The region
is also more susceptible to shocks, such as declines in commodity prices,
public health crises like Ebola, natural disasters like droughts and
floods, violent conflicts, non-tariff trade barriers imposed by other coun-
tries, and reductions in overseas development assistance prompted by
the 2008 financial crisis.211 As a result, even though many sub-Saharan
African countries made substantial progress in absolute terms,212 the
global MDG benchmarks that were based on percentages created an even
greater onus on a region that had less capacity to respond.213 This was
also true for the water and sanitation MDGs. Countries with low base-
lines and with rapid population growth, such as in sub-Saharan Africa,
206 EDWARD ANDERSON & MALCOLM LANGFORD, A DISTORTED METRIC: THE MDGS AND STATE
CAPACITY 2 (2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2217772 [https://perma.cc/QP7M
-N7SJ] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018); Jan Vandemoortele, MDGs: Misunderstood Targets?,
IDEAS WORK. PAP. SER. REPEC (2007).
207 See ANDERSON & LANGFORD, supra note 206, at 2 (“It led to the rather odd situation
where upon the adoption of the MDGs, China [announced] that it had already met the
MDG income poverty target, in 1999.”).
208 Id.; William Easterly, How the Millennium Development Goals are Unfair to Africa,
Brookings Global Econ. and Dev., Working Paper No. 14 (Nov. 2007).
209 See U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, supra note 171, at 79 (noting in 2015, Africa was only on
track to attaining MDG 2 (achieve universal primary education), MDG 3 (promote gender
equality and empower women) and the targets related to MDG 6 (combat HIV/AIDS,
malaria and other diseases)).
210 See WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 12, at 94; U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, supra note 171, at
xiv–xvii, 1–4.
211 U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, supra note 171, at xiv–xvii, 1–4.
212 Suzman Statement Dec. 2013, supra note 175.
213 WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 12, at 94; Melamed, supra note 173, at 5.
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faced more difficulty in meeting the targets.214 The key lesson learned
from a 2015 review of progress on the MDGs in Africa by the U.N. Devel-
opment Program was that initial conditions mattered in a country’s
ability to achieve progress in the MDG goals.215 At the same time, it would
be a mistake to assume that countries with less ability to meet global
development targets were less sensitive to information disclosed as a
result of MDG monitoring.216 In fact, just the opposite might be true due
to the next factor.
The third factor that mediated the governance effect of the MDGs
was the influence of external actors, which in the field of international
development includes financial institutions, international agencies, donors,
and NGOs. Different factors motivated each of these organizations, which
used the information for their own distinct purposes. Regardless, the
compilation and disclosure of information about progress towards the
MDGs influenced the agendas of these external actors, who, in turn, had
the capacity to impact the priorities of developing nations, especially
those dependent on foreign assistance. Indeed, the strong influence of
these external actors speaks to their power relative to poor countries.
International financial institutions and development banks, such
as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, sought to help
countries achieve progress on the MDGs.217 The World Bank proclaimed
that it was “committed to helping achieve the MDGs because, simply put,
these goals are our goals.”218 For example, to support the MDGs, the
World Bank focused on improving incomes for the bottom 40% in each
country, increasing agriculture financing to $8–10 billion per year,219
expanding funding for education220 and gender equality,221 and enhancing
214 WHO/UNICEF JMP 2015 UPDATE, supra note 11, at 7.
215 U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, supra note 171, at 62.
216 The MDGs have been criticized for their one-size-fits-all approach to development. See
FUKUDA-PARR & YAMIN, supra note 32; ANDERSON & LANGFORD, supra note 206.
217 See generally WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 12.
218 See generally THE WORLD BANK, MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS, http://www5
.worldbank.org/mdgs/ [https://perma.cc/5UWZ-HPEQ] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
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AND HUNGER BY 2015, http://www5.worldbank.org/mdgs/poverty_hunger.html [https://
perma.cc/5ZCQ-GYGU] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
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/H6QJ-XG9T] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
221 THE WORLD BANK, MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS, PROMOTE GENDER EQUALITY
AND EMPOWER WOMEN BY 2015, http://www5.worldbank.org/mdgs/gender.html [https://
perma.cc/RL8E-RUUP] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
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debt relief initiatives for poor countries.222 The data disclosed through the
MDG process was a powerful motivator. In response to data showing that
the child mortality MDG was lagging behind other goals, the World Bank
“redoubl[ed]” its efforts in this area.223 The Bank’s support provided a
powerful validation of the MDG (and now SDG) effort because such
institutions directly and indirectly influence financial aid and capacity-
building assistance to developing countries.224 Improved progress on
MDG indicators also sent positive signals to the private capital markets
that invest in developing countries.
The disclosure of information that was made possible through the
MDG monitoring effort also helped the donor community make informed
decisions, which in turn, influenced the development priorities of coun-
tries dependent on such assistance.225 As a result of the MDG efforts,
overseas development assistance increased, with an estimated $134.7
billion provided in 2013, as compared to $80 billion in the mid-1990s.226
The global financial crisis of 2008–2009 had threatened to derail develop-
ment efforts,227 but the 2010 MDG Summit228 encouraged states to renew
their commitments to the MDGs. It also prompted the U.N. Development
Program to oversee a major acceleration program to try to attain more
targets by the 2015 deadline.229 In addition, international donors, such
as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, embraced the MDGs, finding
that their focus on simple and measurable targets created a powerful
impact.230 The Gates Foundation has also funded numerous projects that
222 THE WORLD BANK, MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS, DEVELOP A GLOBAL PARTNER-
SHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT BY 2015, http://www5.worldbank.org/mdgs/global_partnership
.html [https://perma.cc/FW96-T5NF] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
223 THE WORLD BANK, MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS, REDUCE CHILD MORTALITY BY
2015, http://www5.worldbank.org/mdgs/child_mortality.html [https://perma.cc/KJN5
-NGM5] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
224 WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 12, at 107.
225 Fukuda-Parr et al., supra note 27.
226 WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 12, at 91.
227 Kjørven, supra note 172, at 2; see also G.A. Res. 65/1, Keeping the promise: united to
achieve the Millennium Development Goals, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/1, ¶ 22 (October 19,
2010), http://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/65 [https://perma.cc/DDV2-JVPH].
228 G.A. Res. 65/1, supra note 227.
229 U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, MDG ACCELERATION FRAMEWORK, http://www.undp
.org/content/dam/undp/library/Poverty%20Reduction/MDG%20Strategies/MAF%20Report
%20Dec%202011.pdf [https://perma.cc/ELS6-BKNS] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018); Kjørven,
supra note 172, at 2.
230 Suzman Statement Dec. 2013, supra note 175; Suzman Statement Mar. 2013, supra
note 138; Melinda French Gates, Melinda French Gates—United Nations General Assembly
2010, Remarks on Progress Against the MDGs (Sep. 22, 2010), https://www.gatesfounda
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specifically focus on supporting MDG efforts within particular countries
and across the globe.231
Civil society organizations and international organizations also
recognized the power of the MDGs to drive development priorities and
used information disclosed in country reports to pressure governments to
enhance their efforts and commit more resources towards the MDGs.232
For example, the international NGO WaterAid worked with countries to
achieve their MDG water and sanitation targets, and also leveraged the
disclosed data to advocate for policy change and highlight continued bar-
riers to access.233 Similarly, the human rights community became in-
creasingly interested in how the MDGs could be harnessed to promote a
human development and human rights-based conception of development,
as is discussed in greater detail in Section II.D.234 Interestingly, not all
tion.org/Media-Center/Speeches/2010/09 /Melinda-French-Gates-UN-General-Assembly
-Address [https://perma.cc/56L8-GNQR].
231 For example, a search of the term “MDGs” on the Gates Foundation website in July
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-Links/Grants-Database/Grants/2015/09/OPP1126356 [https://perma.cc/WE2B-B7S4].
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U.N. agencies were initially invested in the MDGs because they saw
these selective goals as disrupting their existing agendas.235 However,
this reticence has since disappeared, as illustrated by the dominance of
the MDGs/SDGs within the agendas of many U.N. agencies.236
In sum, although the MDGs were not legally binding international
law, the disclosure of information that resulted from the extensive data col-
lection and monitoring efforts enabled the creation of quantitative indica-
tors, which in turn had a governance effect in many countries. The same
three factors that mediated the governance effect of the TRI—the com-
municative power of a simple quantitative indicator; the capacity and wil-
lingness of the target actor to change its behavior; and the ability of
external stakeholders to influence the target actor—also influenced the
impact of the MDGs. Because the SDGs build directly on the MDGs’
monitoring and disclosure efforts, especially in the water sector, a similar
governance effect can be expected.237
The next section applies the second half of the conceptual frame-
work to the global water sector by examining the potential knowledge
235 Fukuda-Parr et al., supra note 27, at 8.
236 See, e.g., U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, Millennium Development Goals, http://www.undp.org
/content/undp/en/home/sdgoverview/mdg_goals.html [https://perma.cc/9ZP8-YRBH] (last
visited Jan. 21, 2018); WHO, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), WHO, http://www
.who.int/topics/millennium_development_goals/en/ [https://perma.cc/NJ4R-55JY] (last
visited Jan. 21, 2018); FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., Millennium Development
Goals, http://www.fao.org/sustainable-development-goals/mdg/en/ [https://perma.cc
/R4WH-ZT2J] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
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For example, many at the Gates Foundation have been more skeptical of the SDGs due
to their expansive scope and inclusion of targets that are less measurable than the MDGs.
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HUMANOSPHERE, May 11, 2015, http://www.humanosphere.org/world-politics/2015/05
/gates-foundation-says-it-does-support-the-un-development-agenda/ [https://perma.cc
/53LA-CG2E] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018); Tom Paulson, Gates Foundation rallies the
troops to attack UN development goals, HUMANOSPHERE, May 6, 2015, http://www.hu
manosphere.org/world-politics/2015/05/gates-foundation-rallies-the-troops-to-attack-un
-development-goals/ [https://perma.cc/K4X4-LKK9] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018). As a re-
sult, a large debate raged over how many goals the SDGs should encompass. See, e.g.,
David Griggs et al., Sustainable development goals for people and planet, 495 NATURE 305,
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tent/uploads/2013/06/140505-An-Action-Agenda-for-Sustainable-Development.pdf
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effects that can result from translating legal norms into quantitative
indicators.
C. Knowledge Effects of Global Water Indicators
1. Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”)
If statistical rankings are likely to incentivize compliance with the
water, sanitation and hygiene targets of the SDGs, at least under certain
conditions, then it is critical that the quantitative indicators used to
measure progress in fact reflect the intended normative goals. The con-
cepts of calculability, data inertia, and expertise inertia help explain why
certain knowledge effects have resulted from the translation of global
water goals into technical indicators. The lessons from the MDGs are
once again instructive because the SDG water monitoring efforts build
directly on this earlier initiative.
The MDGs were largely designed to be calculable, which means
that they were generally framed around certain “outcome” indicators.238
It was difficult to generate relevant monitoring indicators for targets that
were not easily quantifiable.239 This was also true of the water goals.
Target 7.C of the MDGs committed to “halv[ing] by 2015, the proportion
of the population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and
basic sanitation.”240 This is a goal that was calculable, at least in theory,
because it could be translated into a number.
The calculability of the water and sanitation targets, however,
was limited by data inertia. There was a complete lack of nationally
representative data about drinking water and sanitation, especially in
developing countries.241 Data had previously been collected by distribut-
ing questionnaires to national authorities, which led to significant quality
control problems.242 Beginning around 2000, the JMP began to rely on
nationally representative household surveys conducted periodically by
national statistics offices, often in conjunction with international agencies,
and on national censuses, which are normally undertaken by countries
238 Fukuda-Parr et al., supra note 27, at 8.
239 WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 12, at 107 (noting that MDG targets such as “achieve
full and productive employment and decent work,” or “universal access to reproductive
health” were not as easily quantifiable).
240 WHO/UNICEF JMP 2015 UPDATE, supra note 11, at 7.
241 IAEG-SDGS, supra note 42.
242 Bartram et al., supra note 14, at 8143.
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at ten-year intervals.243 In general, national level data has been inte-
grated with other available sources of information and adjusted for global
comparison.244 Because these different sources of data use terms inconsis-
tently, the JMP spends considerable effort to verify and harmonize the
data; ultimately, it estimates coverage using statistical methods.245
Although many data integrity challenges remain,246 the JMP has also
sought to improve data collection, such as by recommending changes to
core questions across different household surveys.247
Due to the limitations in data availability during the MDG era,
the JMP used the indicator of “improved” water sources as a proxy for
“safe water,” on the assumption that such sources would likely be pro-
tected against fecal contamination.248 Improved sources included: piped
water into dwelling, yard or plot; public taps or standpipes; boreholes or
tubewells; protected dug wells; protected springs and rainwater.249
However, because this indicator was a proxy for safe water, it assessed
whether a tap was available, even if it did not function properly or the
water quality was poor. A similar metric was used for sanitation, where
an “improved” sanitation facility referred to a variety of technologies
(flush or pour flush toilets to sewer systems, septic tanks or pit latrines,
ventilated improved pit latrines, pit latrines with a slab, and composting
toilets), but did not capture actual effectiveness.250
Definitions matter. According to James Bartram and colleagues,
who have first-hand experience with global monitoring of water and
sanitation:
If a measure of the quality of the water were incorporated
into the definition of an improved drinking water facility,
the drinking water component of the MDG target would be
243 Id. at 8141, 8144 (noting that countries will consult with UNICEF, USAID, or the World
Bank, respectively, to conduct Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (“MICS”), Demographic
and Health Surveys (“DHS”), or Living Standards Measurement Studies (“LSMS”)).
244 IAEG-SDGS, supra note 42, at 2; WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 12, at 107.
245 Bartram et al., supra note 14, at 8146–49; WHO/UNICEF JMP, Methods, https://wash
data.org/monitoring/methods [https://perma.cc/3RDE-2992] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
246 Bartram et al., supra note 14, at 8154–57 (discussing challenges such as the fact that
there are often large discrepancies between national and international estimates and
that censuses may not be accurate if they exclude marginalized groups, such as those
living in informal settlements).
247 Id. at 8153.
248 IAEG-SDGS, supra note 42.
249 WHO/UNICEF JMP 2015 UPDATE, supra note 11.
250 Id.; WHO/UNICEF JMP 2017 UPDATE, supra note 11; Bartram et al., supra note 14.
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badly off track; and if households sharing sanitation facili-
ties otherwise classified as “improved” were considered to
have adequate sanitation, then the sanitation component
of the MDG target would be judged to be on track.251
The MDG indicators inadvertently created perverse incentives by
motivating governments and donors to adopt short-term solutions that
may not have been sustainable.252 Even the U.N. Development Program,
which had primary responsibility within the U.N. system for the MDGs
and is otherwise a champion of the goals, observed that “[t]he MDG focus
on outcomes such as poverty reduction without particular attention to
the underlying causes has led in some cases to undesirable, unintended
and often unsustainable consequences.”253 The MDGs tended to promote
capital investments in infrastructure without attention to recurring costs.
For example, approximately one-third of hand pumps in rural sub-Saha-
ran Africa are non-operational at any given time,254 yet only a fraction of
funding is allocated to operations and maintenance.255 Similarly, coun-
tries with large populations without access to sanitation, like India, made
concerted efforts to build toilets, but often without assessing the long-
term sustainability of such measures.256
This is not a phenomenon unique to the water and sanitation
sector; for example, the U.N. Development Program found that invest-
ments were made in schools and medical facilities in Africa to achieve
MDG targets without considering the need to pay for staff and equip-
ment.257 Similarly, a narrow focus on achieving particular MDG outcomes
251 Bartram et al., supra note 14, at 8157.
252 Langford & Winkler, supra note 41, at 150; U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, supra note 171, at 63.
253 U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, supra note 171, at 63.
254 WHO/UNICEF JOINT MONITORING PROGRAMME FOR WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION,
DRINKING WATER—EQUITY, SAFETY AND SUSTAINABILITY, THEMATIC REPORT 54 (2011),
https://washdata.org [https://perma.cc/55Z9-YS92].
255 WORLD HEALTH ORG. & UN-WATER, UN-WATER GLOBAL ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT
OF SANITATION AND DRINKING-WATER (GLAAS): THE CHALLENGE OF EXTENDING AND
SUSTAINING SERVICES 29 (2012), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/44849/1/97892
41503365_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/E672-YCEC].
256 C.A. KUMAR & U. SINGH, THE WORLD BANK, YOU MANAGE WHAT YOU MEASURE: USING
MOBILE PHONES TO STRENGTHEN OUTCOME MONITORING IN RURAL SANITATION (2012),
https://www.wsp.org/sites/wsp.org/files/publications/WSP-Manage-What-You-Measure
-Using-Mobile-Phones-Strengthen-Outcome-Monitoring-Rural-Sanitation.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4HRS-N2RN]; see also S. Murthy, D. Shemie, & F. Bichai, The Role of Adapta-
tion in Mobile Technology Innovation for the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Sector, 13(1)
WATER PRACTICE & TECHNOLOGY (forthcoming).
257 U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, supra note 171, at 63.
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sometimes obscured the importance of developing stronger national insti-
tutions.258 For instance, although global funds enabled Africa to make
significant progress in reducing HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis—which
were explicit MDG targets—less funding was spent on improving health
systems.259 As a result, many countries did not have the ability to re-
spond to other public health crises, like the Ebola outbreak.260 Although
the MDGs promoted foreign aid, less attention was paid to the long-term
development of capacity, institutions, and technology.261 In some in-
stances, some aid-dependent countries became susceptible to the “for-
tunes of donor countries,” which undermined the long-term sustainability
of their own MDG efforts.262
The MDGs’ focus on achieving comparatively simple goals that
could be measured and reported as quantitative indicators sometimes
resulted in a focus on meeting basic needs, rather than enhancing the
capacity for a human rights–based approach to development.263 It also
tended to create a “silo-effect,” where the international community focused
on trying to achieve the stated goals instead of trying to build national
capacity across sectors.264 Because the MDGs served as performance
standards against which development progress could be benchmarked,
those issues that were not explicitly incorporated into the MDGs tended
to be sidelined.265 Due to this selective cherry-picking, the MDGs some-
times disrupted then-existing development efforts.266
In addition, the MDG water targets only looked at national aver-
ages, obscuring significant disparities between populations.267 Thus, a
country could be reported as having “met” its MDG targets, even if certain
populations of people continued to be excluded.268 Lack of subnational
258 Cf. Suzman Statement Dec. 2013, supra note 175 (“The MDGs succeeded in part
because they did not pretend to be the ‘sum total’ of development. . . . They are deliberately
ends rather than means, and as such are not the blueprint for development.”).
259 U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, supra note 171, at 63.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 64.
262 Id.
263 Fukuda-Parr et al., supra note 27, at 5, 7 (noting that a human rights–based approach to
development focuses “on people not as the beneficiaries of specific programs but as active
agents in changing the social relations and structures that perpetuate rights deprivations.”).
264 Id. at 6–7.
265 Id. at 6 (arguing, for example, that MDG’s focus on achieving universal primary edu-
cation overshadowed other key issues, such as quality of education, early childhood
education, adult literacy, etc.).
266 Id. at 8.
267 Id. at 6.
268 Melamed, supra note 173, at 4 (suggesting that because the national averages reported
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data about vulnerable groups also prevented countries from developing
effective targeted programs.269 
These examples highlight how a quantitative indicator can take
on a life of its own and create unintended knowledge effects that change
the policy discourse. It also suggests that the technical indicators may
matter more than the text of the internationally negotiated documents
that give rise to the legal norms in the first place.270
However, the MDGs also brought greater awareness of the need
to overcome data inertia, as suggested by these startling statistics: “In
2003, only four developing countries had two or more data points for at
least sixteen of the twenty-two MDG indicators. By 2013, 129 countries
met this metric of data availability.”271 The MDG monitoring efforts led
to more household surveys being conducted around the world and to
more coordination between national statistical offices and international
experts.272 More work remains on improving data availability, reliability,
and quality, and reducing the time lag between data collection and
reporting.273 Mindful of these prior shortcomings, the SDGs include a
greater focus on reporting disaggregated data so as to reveal inequities
and inequalities between different subpopulations within a country.274
Expertise inertia is often a hidden challenge. While many na-
tional statistical offices have had their capacity improved, that has not
always been the case. In some instances, the data is collected and re-
ported by international agencies, effectively sidelining national efforts.275
To the extent that global indicators continue to be created primarily by
international experts, who tend to be from developed countries in the
West, they may inherently suffer from expertise inertia because they do
not incorporate a wider variety of experiences.276
by the MDGs masked inequalities, “the MDGs did not incentivise a particular focus on
the poorest or the hardest to reach.”).
269 U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, supra note 171, at 66–67.
270 This is ironic given the greater “status” that the politically negotiated goals and
targets have. See McArthur, supra note 140, at 17; David Donoghue, My Perspective on
the SDG Negotiations, DELIVER 2030 8 (2016), http://deliver2030.org/?p=6909 [https://
perma.cc/VNU2-YNCM] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
271 WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 12, at 107. See also U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, supra note
171, at 62.
272 IAEG-SDGS, supra note 42, at 2; WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 12, at 107; U.N. DEV.
PROGRAM, supra note 171, at xi.
273 WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 12, at 107.
274 See G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 15, ¶¶ 17, 18.
275 WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 12, at 107.
276 MERRY, supra note 3, at 6.
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The expert agency responsible for monitoring the water, sanitation,
and hygiene targets—the JMP, a collaborative effort between UNICEF
and the World Health Organization that began in 1991—has sought to
continually refine its monitoring techniques and be responsive to criti-
cism about the limitations of its proxy indicators. For example, it started
to use a “ladder approach” to show access to different service levels.277 This
more flexible methodology allowed countries to monitor access at levels
corresponding to their national capacity and resources.278 In 2011, as part
of a broader “post-2015 development process” intended to identify what
would replace the MDGs when the goals expired in 2015, the JMP also
began to hold international consultations with different stakeholders to im-
prove its indicators.279 The process of developing the MDG goals, targets,
and indicators had been criticized for being non-transparent and non-
inclusive.280 In contrast, the process of developing the SDGs was compar-
atively more open and inclusive, with greater participation by NGOs and
other non-state actors.281 The human rights community played an active
role in helping the JMP to refine its indicators, as discussed in Section
II.D. These efforts helped the JMP to overcome inherent expertise inertia
277 The four categories for water were: piped water on premises, other improved water,
unimproved sources and surface water. WHO/UNICEF JMP 2017 UPDATE, supra note 11,
at 5. A similar ladder existed for sanitation: “improved” facility (defined above); “unim-
proved facility” (i.e., flush/pour flush not going to sewer/septic/pit, pit latrines without a
slab, hanging and bucket latrine); and the last rung of the ladder was open defecation.
Id. at 8, 33.
278 U.N. WATER, supra note 163, at 7.
279 IAEG-SDGS, supra note 42; WHO/UNICEF JMP 2017 UPDATE, supra note 11, at 13–14.
280 See Nanda, supra note 141, at 398; U.N. System Task Team on the Post-2015 U.N.
Development Agenda, supra note 172, at 46–47 (Annex II highlights the key strengths
and weaknesses of the MDGs); FUKUDA-PARR & YAMIN, supra note 32. But see McArthur,
supra note 140, at 6.
281 The High Level Political Forum overseeing the SDG process specifically involved non-
state actors through the Major Groups and Other Stakeholders. See, e.g., IAEG-SDG,
Open Consultation with Civil Society, Academia and Private Sector, SUSTAINABLE DE-
VELOPMENT GOALS, https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/iaeg-sdgs/open-consultation-stakeholders
[https://perma.cc/7PP6-79CH] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018); Major Groups and Other Stake-
holders High Level Political Forum Coordination Mechanism Terms of Reference (2017),
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/12947HLPFMGoSCM-ToR
Jan2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FSX-4T8V]. In May 2015, I had the opportunity to observe
this process directly by giving a short speech on behalf of the International Council for
Science, which coordinated the Scientific and Technological Community Major Group at the
Interactive Dialogue with Major Groups.” See U.N. NGLS, Ms. Sharmila Murthy—
Suffolk & Harvard University—May UN Post-2015 Negotiations, YOUTUBE (July 16,
2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=76pYKUlfEwU [https://perma.cc /4E43-GSYK].
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because by including other perspectives into the discussion, they were
necessarily broadening their pool of knowledge.
2. Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”)
In developing new water, sanitation, and hygiene indicators for
the SDGs, the JMP has sought to address the calculability, data inertia,
and expertise inertia challenges it faced with the MDGs.282 The SDG
target on water access seeks to achieve by 2030 “universal and equitable
access to safe and affordable drinking water for all.”283 The JMP has
improved upon the “proxy” water indicator by adding three key criteria
to its MDG definition of an “improved” water source. It is measuring
whether an improved source is (1) “located on premises,” which will ad-
dress concerns about the level of accessibility of the water source, includ-
ing the amount of time individuals might otherwise spend walking to a
water source; (2) “available when needed,” which will help ensure that
the water source actually works in the long run; and (3) “free of faecal
(and priority chemical) contamination,” which will tackle safety and
quality concerns.284 The JMP is also continuing to use a ladder approach
to enable countries to show progress in improving service levels.285
The SDGs specifically commit to expanding access to “affordable”
water, but affordability remains a difficult issue to measure due to data
inertia and expertise inertia.286 There is a certain irony in this because the
price of water is in fact a number that could be quantified. The calcu-
lability problem is twofold: first, data on water pricing—an inherently
282 WHO/UNICEF, About the JMP, WASHDATA, https://washdata.org/how-we-work/about
-jmp [https://perma.cc/822N-ZNJG] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
283 G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 15, at ¶ 6.1.
284 IAEG-SDGS, supra note 42, at 2.
285 For household water, the proposed water service ladder for SDG monitoring has four
levels: at the top is “safely managed water,” the definition of which is noted above; next
is “basic water,” which is the old definition of “improved water” under the MDG monitoring
(as noted in the excerpt above) with a total collection time of no more than thirty minutes
for a round trip, including waiting time; the third level is “unimproved water,” which is
either an “unimproved source” (i.e., unprotected dug well, unprotected spring, cart with
small tank/drum, bottled water) or an “improved source” with a total collection time of
over thirty minutes; and the last rung of the ladder is surface water. WHO/UNICEF, supra
note 11, at 6. The JMP has also used a ladder approach to report disparities in service
levels, such as between rural, urban and total populations at the subnational, country,
regional and global levels. WHO/UNICEF JMP 2015 UPDATE, supra note 11, at 42.
286 See WHO/UNICEF JMP 2012 UPDATE, supra note 146, at 15; WHO/UNICEF JMP 2017
UPDATE, supra note 11, at 20.
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local topic—is not readily available at the national or global level; second,
the concept of affordability itself is not well-defined. Debates exist as to
whether affordability should be calculated as a proportion of income and
if so, at what proportion, or as the ability to have sufficient water without
compromising other basic needs, such as food or medicine.287 These are
all difficult to measure given existing data availability. Moreover, even if
there is standardization as to how to measure affordability, context mat-
ters: what might be affordable in the United States would not necessarily
be affordable in Zambia.288 In addition, calculating water affordability
based on the average or median income in a community would necessarily
mean that lower income individuals in a community would be paying a
disproportionately larger amount of their income.289 The JMP recognizes
these data inertia and expertise inertia challenges, and is working with the
World Bank, academics, and others to develop and test relevant indica-
tors.290 It has also begun to “use available data on household expenditure,
tariffs, income and poverty to start benchmarking affordability across coun-
tries and reporting national, regional and global trends.”291 For example,
it has undertaken a preliminary analysis of household expenditure on
water, sanitation, and hygiene as a proportion of total expenditure.292
A similar story can be told for the SDG sanitation target, which
resulted from an international commitment to provide by 2030 “access
to adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all and end open
defecation, paying special attention to the needs of women and girls and
those in vulnerable situations.”293 The relevant indicator will measure
the “proportion of population using safely managed sanitation services,
including a hand-washing facility with soap and water.”294 The sanitation
component enhances the old MDG definition of “improved” sanitation by
287 NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING
WATER AND WASTEWATER AFFORDABILITY PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (2014);
U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, PUBLIC WATER COST PER HOUSEHOLD: ASSESSING FINAN-
CIAL IMPACTS OF EPA AFFORDABILITY CRITERIA IN CALIFORNIA CITIES 6–7, 10 (2014),
https://www.cacities.org/getattachment/Member-Engagement;/Regional-Divisions/Los
-Angeles-County/Water-Cost-Per-Household-Report-California-Cities.pdf.aspx [https://
perma.cc/E4VA-VWFB]; U.N. Gen. Assembly, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the
human right to safe drinking water and sanitation [hereinafter Affordability Report], UN
DOC A/HRC/30/39, ¶ 32 (July 6, 2015).
288 See Affordability Report, supra note 287, ¶ 28.
289 U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 287, at 3.
290 WHO/UNICEF JMP 2017 UPDATE, supra note 11, at 20.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 15, at ¶ 6.2.
294 IAEG-SDGS, supra note 42, at 5.
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incorporating into the indicator whether that facility is (1) “not shared
with other households”; and (2) whether the “excreta is safely disposed
in situ or treated off-site.”295 Similar to its reporting for water, the JMP
is continuing to use a ladder approach for reporting access to sanitation,
with the “safely managed sanitation” indicator now at the top.296 The in-
formation from this indicator will also inform another SDG target that
commits to halving the proportion of untreated wastewater.297
Interestingly, the sanitation target does not address affordability,
but this is an oversight of the 2030 Agenda declaration, not the JMP.
Even where subsidies exist to help construct toilets, the long-term main-
tenance costs can be a barrier to usage.298 The homeowner either needs
to pay the fees associated with a networked sewer system or assume the
costs of building and maintaining a pit latrine, septic tank or other on-
site option.299 For example, once a pit latrine becomes full, either the pit
needs to be emptied or the latrine needs to be moved to a new site, both of
which cost money.300 Additional water may be needed for flushing, which
can further increase costs. Similarly, shared facilities, such as public toilets,
may have fees associated with them, which may dissuade individuals from
using them. Recognizing these issues, the JMP is including costs of sanita-
tion and hygiene in its current calculations of household expenditures.301
The MDGs had been criticized for not explicitly including a refer-
ence to hygiene, despite the fact that clear links exist between good health
and hygiene.302 Thus, its inclusion in the SDGs is significant. Building on
the recommendations of a post-2015 working group, the JMP interprets
the term hygiene as “the conditions and practices that help maintain
health and prevent spread of disease including hand washing, menstrual
hygiene management and food hygiene.”303 However, because data on
handwashing is more readily available than data on menstrual hygiene
management or food hygiene at home, the JMP only plans to actually
measure handwashing with soap at home.304 In other words, as with the
295 WHO/UNICEF JMP 2017 UPDATE, supra note 11, at 44–46.
296 Id. at 11.
297 This issue is covered by a separate target that is being managed by a different U.N.
agency (Target 6.3, which is being assessed by GEMI), but coordination between the
agencies is anticipated. IAEG-SDGS, supra note 42, at 8–9.
298 Affordability Report, supra note 287.
299 WHO/UNICEF JMP 2017 UPDATE, supra note 11, at 20.
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 18.
303 WHO/UNICEF JMP 2015 UPDATE, supra note 11, at 9.
304 Id. at 10.
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early efforts to measure water and sanitation access under the MDGs,
data inertia limits the calculability of this new SDG indicator on hygiene.
Cognizant of the SDG target language regarding the expanding
“universal” access to water and paying “special attention to the [sanitation
and hygiene] needs of women and girls and those in vulnerable situations,”
the JMP is also developing indicators to measure water, sanitation, and
hygiene access at other locations besides the home.305 Data availability
will dictate these monitoring efforts, with an initial focus on basic access
at schools and health care facilities because data is more accessible at
these locations.306 However, the JMP’s broad efforts to provide a more ho-
listic interpretation of the SDG targets are largely the result of a lengthy
and collaborative effort to improve the MDG indicators by soliciting the
feedback of a variety of stakeholders, which reflects the agency’s efforts
to overcome expertise inertia.
Both the water and sanitation/hygiene SDG targets stress the
importance of providing equitable access, which was not emphasized in
the MDGs.307 As a result, significant energy is being invested into report-
ing data that is disaggregated by subpopulation so that such disparities
can be revealed.308 However, these efforts will only be as good as the data
gathering process, i.e., data inertia may continue to create a bottleneck.
Highly relevant to overcoming the challenges of data inertia, Target
17.18 of the SDGs commits “to increase significantly the availability of
high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender,
age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and
other characteristics relevant in national contexts.” The JMP has taken
note of this mandate and plans to “continue to develop its reporting of
inequalities and their progressive reduction.”309
The JMP’s current categories for disaggregation are urban/rural;
wealth; and affordability; and the others are to be determined.310 To truly
assess inequalities, states will need to ensure that they identify vulnera-
ble and marginalized groups and gather data specifically on those popu-
lations. The JMP has pointed out that it is not possible to measure
inequalities within a given household according to sex, age, or disability
given the existing questionnaires; however, it can estimate gender equality
305 G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 15, ¶ 6.2.
306 WHO/UNICEF JMP 2012 UPDATE, supra note 146, at 5–9 (depicting service ladders
for monitoring WASH in schools and in health care facilities).
307 Fukuda-Parr et al., supra note 27, at 6.
308 G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 15, ¶ 17.18.
309 WHO/UNICEF JMP 2015 UPDATE, supra note 11, at 3.
310 Id. at 35.
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based on time spent for water collection.311 For example, in 2010, women
and girls were responsible for collecting water 71% of the time when they
lived in households without running water in sub-Saharan Africa.312
The SDG targets on expanding water, sanitation, and hygiene
access build directly on the MDG indicators and leverage the expertise
of the JMP, an agency that has taken steps to improve the calculability
of its indicators and address concerns about data inertia and expertise
inertia. Although some efforts, like addressing affordability and measur-
ing hygiene, are necessarily limited, it is likely that the JMP will con-
tinue to enhance these metrics. Moreover, given the SDG’s emphasis on
improving data collection and disaggregation, the capacity of national
statistical offices will likely continue to increase. Yet, part of the JMP’s
success also lies in the fact that the targets on expanding access to water,
sanitation, and hygiene are inherently calculable if the data and exper-
tise exists. In contrast, the process-oriented “means of implementation”
SDG targets are more difficult to measure.313
The challenges of developing a satisfactory indicator to measure
community participation in improving water and sanitation management
highlights how data and expertise inertia can compound inherent calcula-
bility challenges. Target 6.b of the SDGs seeks to “support and strengthen
the participation of local communities in improving water and sanitation
management.”314 The only indicator currently being developed, however,
is “percentage of local administrative units with established and opera-
tional policies and procedures for participation of local communities in
water and sanitation management.”315 This is clearly a very narrow view
of participation. Even if such policies exist, are they actually being im-
plemented? Even if they are being implemented, are the policies and
procedures a meaningful vehicle for local community involvement in
decision-making? Who is selected from the community and how? To what
degree do the decision-makers actually consider the input of the commu-
nity? And who exactly is the “community”—i.e., are women and marginal-
ized individuals included?
311 Although Target 6.1 relating to water access does not mention women and girls, the
JMP interprets the phrase “paying special attention to the needs of women and girls”
(G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 15, ¶ 6.2) to encompass reducing the burden of collecting
water. IAEG-SDGS, supra note 42, at 3.
312 See, e.g., WHO/UNICEF JMP 2015 UPDATE, supra note 11, at 31.
313 G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 15, ¶¶ 6.a–b.
314 Id. at ¶ 6.b.
315 IAEG-SDGS, supra note 42, at 34.
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Not only is participation not as calculable as something like water
quality, but efforts to measure participation also suffer from data inertia
because this information has not historically been gathered and was not
included in the precursor MDG targets. In addition, a relatively new
initiative, the U.N. Water Global Analysis and Assessment for Sanitation
and Drinking Water (“GLAAS”), has been tasked with developing a
methodology for assessing this indicator.316 GLAAS was created in 2008
to gather data on the financial inputs, human resource capacities, and
policy frameworks in the sanitation and drinking water sector.317 Unlike
the JMP, GLAAS has not previously had the same opportunity to engage
a wide variety of stakeholders on the development and monitoring of the
indicator for participation, but moving forward, it plans to undertake
these kinds of consultations.318
One way for GLAAS to consider enhancing the indicator for
participation despite the existing data and expertise inertia challenges
may be to conduct more detailed assessments in a few targeted locations.
Although the opportunity for participation and input into policy formula-
tion is important, most people probably do not want to spend their free
time attending water and sewer utility board meetings. Rather, partici-
pation usually becomes an issue when there is a problem, such as the
lead poisoning crisis that afflicted Flint, Michigan. Once the crisis re-
solves, there tends to be less interest in continuing to participate in the
mundane business of operating a water-service. Perhaps through a sur-
vey or a review of media coverage, GLAAS could identify a few select
geographic locations each year that experienced some sort of crisis with
respect to water and sanitation access. In those locations, it could work
with national statistics offices, international organizations, and/or academ-
ics, to do a more detailed survey of participation. Such an approach could
address the existing limitations, at least in a few locations, and build
expertise in developing relevant questions.
316 Although GLAAS did not develop the indicators for the process-oriented Means of
Implementation water SDG targets (6.a and 6.b), it has taken the lead to develop the
methodological note and to monitor these indicators because it was thought that GLAAS
was best placed to do this in collaboration with partners such as OECD and UNEP.
Personal communication with U.N.-Water GLASS team, World Health Organization
(Sept. 29, 2017).
317 U.N. WATER & WHO, INVESTING IN WATER AND SANITATION: INCREASING ACCESS,
REDUCING INEQUALITIES: UN-WATER GLOBAL ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF SANITATION
AND DRINKING-WATER [hereinafter GLAAS 2014 REPORT] 2 (2014), http://apps.who.int
/iris/bitstream/10665/139735/1/9789241508087_eng.pdf?ua=1&ua=1 [https://perma.cc
/WK29-CSBN].
318 Personal communication with UN-Water GLAAS team, supra note 316.
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When the SDG water targets are analyzed from the perspective
of calculability, data inertia, and expertise inertia, it becomes clear why
certain information is being prioritized in the indicators. The development
of statistical indicators necessarily favors those factors that can easily be
quantified and demotes more complicated, harder to quantify aspects.319
The analysis further suggests that the quantitative indicators being created
to measure these targets may have greater influence on policymaking
than the politically negotiated text of the actual SDG targets.
D. A Dialogue Between Human Rights and Statistics
An important insight also emerges from the analysis of the way
in which human rights have been influencing the creation of the SDG
water indicators.320 In the 1990s, water was increasingly becoming a con-
cern of the human rights community, at least in part due to protests that
had been erupting around the globe in response to water privatization
efforts.321 In 2002, the U.N. committee responsible for interpreting the In-
ternational Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)
issued General Comment 15 on the Right to Water.322 It determined that
the ICESCR’s articles on the “right to an adequate standard of living,”
the “right to health,” and the “right to life” should be interpreted to en-
compass a right to water.323 This recognition also built on relevant language
in the Convention on the Rights of the Child324 and in the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,325 and
on soft law declarations, such as the Mar del Plata declaration of 1977
discussed in Section II.A.326 As defined in General Comment 15, the right
319 Rosga & Satterthwaite, supra note 32, at 256.
320 U.N. Dev. Programme, The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation
Towards a Common Understanding Among UN Agencies, https://undg.org/wp-content/up
loads/2016/09/6959-The_Human_Rights_Based_Approach_to_Development_Cooperation
_Towards_a_Common_Understanding_among_UN.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8FM-JJHS].
321 See Murthy, supra note 42, at 97–100.
322 Gen. Comment No. 15, supra note 151.
323 Id. at ¶ 3.
324 Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 24.2(c), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (requir-
ing States to combat disease and malnutrition “through the provision of adequate nutritious
foods and clean drinking-water”).
325 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art.
14.2(h), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (requiring States to ensure that women have the
right to “enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to . . . water supply”).
326 U.N. WATER CONFERENCE—RESOLUTIONS, supra note 134, at 66 (“All peoples . . . have
the right to have access to drinking water in quantities and of a quality equal to their
basic needs.”).
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to water “entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically acces-
sible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses.”327 In 2010, the
U.N. General Assembly and the U.N. Human Rights Council adopted
resolutions recognizing a human right to safe drinking water and sanita-
tion.328 In 2008, the Human Rights Council also appointed a Special Rap-
porteur on the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation, who
began to engage the water community on a variety of issues, including
on the shortcomings of the MDGs.
Although the push to recognize water as a human right largely
emerged out of struggles against water privatization, it should be noted
that human rights law does not prohibit the use of private actors in the
delivery of water services.329 Although states have the primary obligation
to ensure that the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation is
progressively realized, private actors can step in and fulfill the need. More-
over, under international human rights law, water and sanitation ser-
vices must be affordable, not free. As a result, many private companies,
such as Nestle,330 Pepsi,331 and Veolia,332 have embraced the idea of water
as a human right because they see themselves as being able to fill a
service gap.
In the 2030 Agenda resolution that gave rise to the SDGs, states
reaffirmed in the Declaration their “commitments regarding the human
right to safe drinking water and sanitation.”333 This inclusion is notewor-
thy because of what was omitted: food and housing, which are expressly
described as human rights under the ICESCR, are framed only as basic
needs. The clear recognition of the right to water and sanitation—which
has only recently been interpreted as a right—reflects the attention given
this issue. This acknowledgment follows several resolutions that had been
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly and Human Rights Council,
327 Gen. Comment No. 14, supra note 151, ¶ 2.
328 G.A. Res 64/292, supra note 150, ¶ 1 (July 28, 2010); Human Rights Council Res. 15/9,
supra note 150, ¶ 3.
329 Murthy, supra note 42, at 90–91; SALZMAN, supra note 12, at 204–05.
330 What about the human right to water?, NESTLE WATERS, http://www.nestle-waters.com
/question-and-answers/what-about-the-human-right-to-water [https://perma.cc/3KAH
-YNUX] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
331 PEPSICO, PepsiCo Guidelines in Support of the Human Right to Water (Oct. 30, 2015),
https://www.pepsico.com/docs/album/default-document-library/pepsicohumanrightto
water.pdf?sfvrsn=0 [https://perma.cc/YTD2-9X7U].
332 VEOLIA WATER, Right to Water—From Concept to Reality (2010), http://www.ohchr.org
/Documents/Issues/Water/ContributionsPSP/Veolia.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9H2-CMS6].
333 G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 15, ¶ 7.
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which highlighted the importance of including the human right to safe
drinking water and sanitation in the post-2015 development agenda.334
In December 2015, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolu-
tion on “[t]he human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation” that
specifically welcomed the reaffirmation of the human right to safe drink-
ing water and sanitation as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development.335 The title of this resolution is notable because it reflects
the evolving consensus that water and sanitation are related but distinct
human rights; this is the first time that a General Assembly resolution
or Human Rights Council resolution has used the plural form. This
resolution followed one adopted in December 2013, in which the General
Assembly specifically called upon states “[t]o give due consideration to
the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation and the principles
of equality and non-discrimination in the elaboration of the post 2015
development agenda.”336 Moreover, the Human Rights Council has also
repeatedly underscored the need to consider the human right to safe
drinking water and sanitation in the post-2015 development agenda.337
Despite the strong advocacy that led to the recognition of the
human right to safe drinking water and sanitation in the 2030 Agenda,338
the actual water, sanitation, and hygiene goals and targets of the SDGs
were not framed in human rights terms.339 Because the 2030 Agenda is
not a treaty, it had the freedom to be ambitious.340 Thus, it is perhaps
puzzling why it did not incorporate more references to human rights,
334 G.A. Res. 70/169, at 1 (Feb. 22, 2016); G.A. Res. 68/157, at ¶ 6 (c) (Feb. 12, 2014);
Human Rights Council Res. 27/7, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/27/7, ¶ 4 (Oct. 2, 2014); Human
Rights Council Res. 24/18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/24/18 , ¶ 10 (Oct. 8, 2013).
335 G.A. Res. 70/169, supra note 334, at 1.
336 G.A. Res. 68/157, supra note 334, ¶ 6(c).
337 Human Rights Council Res. 27/7, supra note 334, ¶ 4; Human Rights Council Res.
24/18, supra note 334, ¶ 10; Human Rights Council Res. 21/2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/2
(Aug. 26, 2013), ¶ 14.
338 See, e.g., Open Letter from Léo Heller, supra note 159, at 2; The Foundations of SDG
6—The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, U.N. WEB TV (2016), http://webtv.un.org
/search/the-foundations-of-sdg-6-the-human-right-to-water-and-sanitation/50311016
05001?term=human%20right%20to%20water%20and%20sanitation [https://perma.cc
/X6GN-44QN] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018); News: The Foundations of SDG 6—The Human
Right to Water and Sanitation, NGO MINING WORKING GROUP (2016), https://miningwg
.com/news/ [https://perma.cc/GM8K-X68X] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
339 In fact, none of the goals or targets in any of the sectors used human rights language
despite strong advocacy by NGOs and several U.N. agencies. See, e.g., U.N. OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & CENTER FOR ECON. AND SOC. RIGHTS, supra note 234.
340 Thomas Pogge & Mitu Sengupta, The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as Drafted:
Nice Idea, Poor Execution, WASH. INT’L L.J. 571, 572 (2015).
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especially considering the natural alignment of the SDG goals with eco-
nomic and social rights and the strong advocacy efforts to do so.341 I
suggest that this did not occur because human rights would have led to
greater accountability than member states wanted. Indeed, even the
softer term “follow-up and review” was used instead of “monitoring and
accountability” due to sensitivities of the block of developing countries
known as the G-77.342 Nations still have human rights obligations under
existing treaties, but grounding the SDGs in human rights would have
enhanced their accountability and legal bindingness. Nevertheless, the
JMP has purposefully incorporated a human rights perspective into its
interpretation of the SDG targets on water, sanitation, and hygiene and
this analysis seeks to explain why.343
The fields of human rights and international development are
often like “ships passing in the night”: the ultimate goals may be similar
but the strategies and priorities are different.344 The economic and
managerial concepts that underpin the MDGs and the SDGs are at odds
with the legal and philosophical theory behind human rights.345 More-
over, U.N. statisticians, who pride themselves on developing objective
indicators, are not usually keen to embrace human rights language, which
they see as advocacy-oriented and difficult to quantify.346
341 See, e.g., Human Rights Caucus Reaction to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Develop-
ment (2015) [hereinafter Human Rights Caucus]; Donoghue, supra note 270, at 7.
342 Donoghue, supra note 270, at 2.
343 For a more detailed assessment of how the water targets of the SDGs specifically
relate to the normative content of the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation,
see ANALYSIS OF THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE
HUMAN RIGHTS TO SAFE DRINKING WATER AND SANITATION, REPORT PREPARED FOR THE
SISTERS OF MERCY ON BEHALF OF THE NGO MINING WORKING GROUP AT THE UNITED NA-
TIONS, compiled by Sharmila L. Murthy (2016) https://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content
/uploads/sites/134/2016/07/Reading-packet-on-HRTWS.pdf [https://perma.cc/9S4K-X8N3].
344 Alston, supra note 166. See also U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, Integrating human rights with
sustainable human development (1998), http://www.crin.org/docs/resources/publications
/hrbap/UNDP_integrating_hr.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5XX-NSBY]; PAUL GREADY, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: TOWARDS A THEORY OF CHANGE (1st
ed. 2014); TAKHMINA KARIMOVA, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2016); PETER UVIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT (2004); Peter Uvin, From the
Right to Development to the Rights-Based Approach: How ‘Human Rights’ Entered Develop-
ment, 17 DEV. IN PRACTICE 597–606 (2007); PHILIP ALSTON & MARY ROBINSON, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT (2005); Human Rights
Caucus, supra note 341; U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & CENTER
FOR ECON. AND SOC. RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 2.
345 Alston, supra note 166, at 807; Darrow, supra note 234, at 68.
346 MERRY, supra note 3, at 24.
2018] TRANSLATING LEGAL NORMS 439
In light of these distinct epistemologies, the JMP’s deliberate
incorporation of a human rights perspective into the technical monitoring
framework is noteworthy. For example, the JMP explains that “[i]nter-
national consultations since 2011 have established consensus on the need
to build on and address the shortcomings of this [proxy water] indicator,
specifically, to address the normative criteria of the human right to
water including accessibility, availability, and quality.”347 Similarly, the
JMP perceives its efforts to disaggregate data as a way of addressing the
human rights concepts of universal access and non-discrimination.348 As
a result, the JMP has been lauded by much of the human rights commu-
nity for its efforts to integrate human rights criteria within its frame-
work for global monitoring.349 However, others argue that the JMP has
not gone far enough in embracing a human rights approach to its moni-
toring efforts.350
The conceptual framework developed in this Article helps to
explain how and why human rights are being translated into statistical
terms. These two distinct approaches have become increasingly fungible
or comparable. This equivalence phenomenon can be partly attributed to
the rise of human rights indicators, which seek to measure compliance
with human rights treaty obligations and thereby transform abstract
legal concepts into specific policy prescriptions.351 For example, the Social
347 WHO/UNICEF JMP 2012 UPDATE, supra note 146.
348 Id. at 3; Bartram et al., supra note 14, at 8157. The SDGs also contain a broader goal
on the need to “reduce inequality within and among countries,” which includes targets
on the need to “empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all,
irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other
status,” and “ensure equal opportunity and reduce inequalities of outcome, including by
eliminating discriminatory laws, policies and practices and promoting appropriate legisla-
tion, policies and action in this regard.” G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 15, at Goal 10. However,
as of April 2017, the indicators for these Goal 10 targets were classified as “Tier III” by
the Inter-agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators (“IAEG-SDGs”), which means that
“[n]o internationally established methodology or standards are yet available for the
indicator, but methodology/standards are being (or will be) developed or tested.” IAEG-
SDGS, TIER CLASSIFICATION FOR GLOBAL SDG INDICATORS 3, 27 (Apr. 20, 2017), https://un
stats.un.org/sdgs/files/Tier%20Classification%20of%20SDG%20Indicators_20%20April
%202017_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/VK4S-FXE6].
349 U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & CENTER FOR ECON. AND SOC.
RIGHTS, supra note 234, at 54–56.
350 Open Letter from Léo Heller, supra note 159.
351 U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 234, at 1–2; Margaret
L. Satterthwaite, Coding Personal Integrity Rights: Assessing Standards-Based Measures
Against Human Rights Law and Practice, 48 NYU J. INT’L POL. 513, 513 (2015); Rosga
& Satterthwaite, supra note 32, at 254; MERRY, supra note 3, at 164.
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and Economic Rights Fulfillment Index provides a quantitative measure
of a country’s fulfillment with social and economic rights.352 Another mea-
sure is the Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Performance Index, which
has been developed as a way to measure progress towards the human
rights to water and sanitation.353
Through the lens of equivalence, we see how two different commu-
nities (human rights and development) that use two distinct languages
(law and statistics) have been able to communicate with each other, thereby
providing a pathway for the integration of the rights to water and sanita-
tion into the SDG technical monitoring process. This process was en-
hanced by channels of communication that were established by the JMP
as part of the post-2015 development process.354 The JMP convened work-
ing groups not only on the target topics, i.e., water, sanitation, and hy-
giene, but also on equality and non-discrimination (“END”). Then–U.N.
Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and
sanitation, Catarina de Albuquerque, chaired the END working group.355
The current U.N. Special Rapporteur, Leo Heller, has continued
to play an active role, including serving as a member of the Strategic
Advisory Group of JMP and GLAAS.356 However, he has also been critical
of the process, publishing an open letter “to express [his] disappointment
that the JMP’s 2017 Progress Report does not incorporate any explicit
human rights language.”357 Although the emphasis could have been
greater, the JMP’s 2017 report does in fact state that “[t]he human rights
to water and sanitation place obligations on States to ensure that ser-
vices are affordable,” and that “[a]ccessibility, availability and quality are
three of the normative criteria of the human right to safe drinking water,
and are used by the JMP for global monitoring of drinking water.”358
Heller also criticized the JMP’s approach for failing to treat affordability
352 Fukuda-Parr et al., An Index of Economic and Social Rights Fulfillment: Concept and
Methodology, 8 J. HUMAN RIGHTS 195, 197–98 (2009); SAKIKO FUKUDA-PARR, FULFILLING SO-
CIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS 15–16 (2015), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebookbatch.GEN
_batch:EDZ000100263520160623 [https://perma.cc/FFZ9-N8UA] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
353 Benjamin Mason Meier et al., Monitoring the Progressive Realization of the Human
Rights to Water and Sanitation: Frontier Analysis as a Basis to Enhance Human Rights
Accountability, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WATER POLITICS AND POLICY (Ken Conca
& E. Weinthal eds., 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2851032 [https://perma.cc
/CE43-WLXF] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
354 See, e.g., WHO/UNICEF JMP 2017 UPDATE, supra note 11, at 1.
355 G.A. Res. 67/270, at 5 (Aug. 8, 2012).
356 Open Letter from Léo Heller, supra note 159.
357 Id. at 2.
358 WHO/UNICEF JMP 2017 UPDATE, supra note 11, at 20, 26.
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and equality as an integral part of the definition of “safely managed”
water and sanitation.359 Although the extent to which the JMP has em-
braced human rights language can be debated, this public exchange under-
scores the open channels of communication between the human rights
and technical monitoring communities.
In addition, the former Special Rapporteur, de Albuquerque, helped
to promote equivalence by unbundling the rights to water and sanitation
into two categories: normative content (quality, accessibility, availability,
affordability and acceptability); and cross-cutting criteria (non-discrimi-
nation, participation, accountability, impact and sustainability).360 The
water community was receptive to this human rights approach because
it dovetailed with existing conceptions of “good” water, sanitation, and
hygiene access, such as the fact that water should be safe.361 In other
words, human rights gave the water community a shorthand way of de-
scribing “ideal” access. Moreover, in response to demands by the human
rights community for a more analytically rigorous way to measure equality
and to identify discrimination in service provision, the JMP heightened
its efforts to disaggregate data by wealth quintiles and by urban-rural
locations even during the MDG monitoring period.362 In addition, the
“ladder” approach used by JMP to show progress was seen as responsive
to the human rights concept of “progressive realization.”363
The unbundling of the rights to water and sanitation into their
constitutive parts has also facilitated the calculability of the rights to
water and sanitation. As noted earlier, the JMP specifically mentioned
three constitutive elements of the right to water in its plans for the SDG
water access indicator: accessibility, availability, and quality. This corres-
ponds with the efforts to measure whether an improved source is located
on premises, available when needed, and free of fecal and certain chemi-
cal contamination.364
The human rights to water and sanitation have influenced the
SDG indicator development process, but the converse may also be true:
359 Open Letter from Léo Heller, supra note 159, at 2.
360 Catarina de Albuquerque, Progress report on the compilation of good practices, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/15/31/Add.1, at ¶ 11 (July 1, 2010), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies
/hrcouncil/docs/15session/A.HRC.15.31.Add.1_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/4H96-GSHC]; Inga T.
Winkler, Margaret L. Satterthwaite & Catarina de Albuquerque, Treasuring What We Mea-
sure and Measuring What We Treasure: Post-2015 Monitoring for the Promotion of Equality
in the Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Sector, 32 WIS. INT’L L.J. 547, 547–48 (2014).
361 See Bartram et al., supra note 14, at 8142.
362 Id.
363 See id.
364 IAEG-SDGS, supra note 42, at 2.
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the technocratic process associated with SDG monitoring of water, sanita-
tion, and hygiene may influence the evolution and content of these rights.
Because the U.N. agencies responsible for developing the water indica-
tors are working directly with countries to implement and measure the
SDGs, the inclusion of a human rights perspective into the SDG monitor-
ing apparatus may enhance state recognition and practice, and thereby
deepen the status of the rights to water and sanitation under interna-
tional law.365 Moreover, global data collected through the MDGs revealed
the depths of the sanitation problem and also the dearth of information
about hygiene, especially menstrual hygiene. The efforts to address these
shortcomings in the SDGs have dovetailed with calls to recognize a right
to sanitation that is related to, but distinct from, the right to water, and
to heighten the status of hygiene as a human rights issue.366
However, the prominent role that the SDG indicator development
process has given to the rights to water and sanitation could also result in
an unintentional knowledge effect. The scope of the rights to water and
sanitation could inadvertently be distorted through the process of develop-
ing indicators because certain criteria of the normative content, such as
accessibility, availability, and quality, are easier to measure than others,
such as participation. As noted earlier, participation has not easily been
quantified, even though it is a key human rights concept.367 Similarly, other
important process-related values, such as accountability and transpar-
ency,368 are not directly measured by the SDG water indicators. Even af-
fordability, which is theoretically calculable, has not been easy to measure.
Some of these human rights concepts are intended to be captured
by other goals. Specifically, Goal 16 of the SDGs seeks to “promote peace-
ful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to
justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions
at all levels,”369 which includes targets on the need to “[e]nsure respon-
sive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all
levels.”370 The proposed indicators for these targets are more comprehensive
365 See BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 16, at 215; HUNTER ET AL., supra note 18; SALZMAN,
supra note 12; ZAELKE ET AL., supra note 20.
366 See, e.g., Murthy, supra note 42, at 92, 102; Winkler et al., supra note 360, at 553,
566–67; Inga Winkler & Virginia Roaf, Taking the Bloody Linen out of the Closet—
Menstrual Hygiene as a Priority for Achieving Gender Equality, 21 CARDOZO J. L. GENDER
1, 1–2, 20–21 (2015).
367 Gen. Comment No. 15, supra note 151, at ¶ 48.
368 Id. at ¶ 49.
369 G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 15, at 25.
370 Id. at Target 16.7. See also id. at Target 16.6 (“Develop effective, accountable and
transparent institutions at all levels.”).
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than the water-specific participation questions because they attempt to
capture participation by different subpopulations371 and assess public
perception of participation processes by subpopulation.372 However, these
indicators are still in the early phase of development and do not yet have
any internationally established methodologies that would facilitate
measurement.373
By design, the indicator development process necessarily priori-
tizes those issues that can be measured. Yet, as this analysis illustrates,
not all things that matter can easily be reduced to quantifiable measure-
ment. In many instances, sufficient data simply does not exist—which
may reflect political priorities and power dynamics because those in posi-
tions of authority do not necessarily want to collect information that
could reveal weaknesses in the system.374 If the human rights to water
and sanitation are simply about ensuring that everyone has access to
sufficient amounts of safe water and toilets, then the existing SDG
indicators may be sufficient. But if, as I am arguing, recognizing water
and sanitation as human rights also means ensuring process-oriented
values, like participation and accountability, then the current indicators
are somewhat deficient. In other words, the scope of the rights to water
and sanitation could be distorted through the indicator development
process because the rights will be equated with only those aspects that
can be easily measured, like water quality. This knowledge effect risks
reducing the meaning of the rights to a few of their constituent ele-
ments—a mere shadow of the true meaning. While the statistics obtained
through monitoring are important for understanding whether the human
rights to water and sanitation are being realized, the two processes are
distinct. As a growing literature on human rights indicators suggests, a
complete picture may only emerge when statistical data is supplemented
by context-specific qualitative data.375
371 Indicator 16.7.1 is the “proportions of positions (by sex, age, persons with disabilities and
population groups) in public institutions (national and local legislatures, public service,
and judiciary) compared to national distributions.” IAEG-SDGS, supra note 42, at 27.
372 Indicator 16.7.2 is the “proportion of population who believe decision-making is inclu-
sive and responsive, by sex, age, disability and population group.” Id.
373 Id. at 3, 27.
374 See Kate Donald, The Politics of ‘Progress’: UN report paints a highly partial picture
of SDG implementation, CTR. FOR ECON. & SOCIAL RIGHTS, http://www.cesr.org/politics
-%E2%80%98progress%E2%80%99-un-report-paints-highly-partial-picture-sdg-imple
mentation [https://perma.cc/M5B3-PTUN] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
375 Rosga & Satterthwaite, supra note 32, at 273; Winkler, Satterthwaite & de Albuquerque,
supra note 360, at 554.
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This analysis not only illustrates how a dialogue is possible be-
tween human rights and statistics, but it also provides important lessons
for human rights advocates seeking to translate their concerns into a
language that can be understood by policymakers. When it comes to
developing quantitative indicators, numbers are the lingua franca. As
the experience from the water sector suggests, human rights often seem
nebulous and intimidating until they are broken down into calculable
elements that can be understood by those in other fields. Because a human
rights perspective often demands more information than is currently
available and requires using new data-gathering methodologies, there is
a need to overcome data inertia and expertise inertia.
This lack of available data and techniques should be understood
as human rights issues because, as I have argued throughout this Arti-
cle, information is a form of power. Under the right conditions, the dis-
closure of information through quantitative indicators can have a strong
governance effect and shape the behavior of governments, business and
individuals, even without binding legal penalties. Many in the human
rights community already recognize this because using information to
“name and shame” is a well-established advocacy technique. However,
what may be less obvious is how the form of information disclosure can
mask or obscure the real problem. For instance, if slum-dwellers are not
included in census data, then statistics showing progress on urban water
access are likely to be inaccurate. These kinds of problems with calcula-
bility, data inertia, and expertise inertia that cause indicators to have
knowledge effects need to be addressed.
Human rights advocates, who tend to be trained in law and may
not be well-versed in math or statistics, should not throw up their hands
in despair when confronted with data gaps; rather, they need to partner
with the statisticians responsible for developing quantitative indicators
to offer constructive input. Quantitative indicators will never be able to
convey the complexity of a problem and they are not a substitute for
contextual and qualitative information.376 But because quantitative
metrics will continue to be used as influential policy tools, human rights
discourse can improve their scope and ultimate impact.
376 The literature on cost-benefit analysis and on human rights indicators both underscore
that not everything can be measured and translated into a number. See, e.g., Ackerman
& Heinzerling, supra note 34, at 1556, 1584; Satterthwaite, supra note 351; Rosga &
Satterthwaite, supra note 32, at 273; Winkler et al., supra note 360, at 554.
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CONCLUSION
In this Article, I proposed a conceptual framework to examine (1)
when quantitative measurements are likely to promote legal compliance,
which is described as a governance effect, and (2) how the construction
of these quantitative indicators can distort the meaning of the original
legal norm, which is known as a knowledge effect. Drawing comparative
lessons from the U.S. environmental literature on information disclosure
and the social science and human rights literature on global indicators,
I applied this new approach to a case study on the global water, sanita-
tion, and hygiene sector.
I argued that through an elaborate global monitoring apparatus
that discloses quantitative information, the “soft law” targets of the SDGs
on water, sanitation, and hygiene have the power to foster legal compli-
ance, shape global norms, and influence national priorities, especially in
developing countries dependent on foreign aid. As the comparative case
study of the TRI highlighted, this potential governance effect is mediated
by three factors—the simplicity of the quantitative indicators, the capac-
ity of the countries to respond to the data, and the influence of external
stakeholders, such as development banks, donors, international organi-
zations, and civil society.
I also argued that the simplicity that allows a quantitative indica-
tor to have a powerful governance effect is a double-edged sword because
the indicator is necessarily limited in what it can convey. The challenges
inherent in translating legal norms into calculable metrics combined
with the problems posed by data inertia and expertise inertia can result
in inaccurate indicators and create knowledge effects that have perverse
policy consequences. As a result, the quantitative indicators being created
to measure the SDG targets may have greater influence on policymaking
and norm development than the politically negotiated text of the U.N.
2030 Agenda. Great efforts have been made to enhance the calculability
of the SDG water targets and address the underlying data inertia and
expertise inertia problems that plagued the MDG monitoring period, but
challenges remain. This is not to say that quantitative indicators do not
provide valuable information, only that their limitations must be recog-
nized so the information disclosed does not stand for more than it should.
Finally, I demonstrated how the human rights to safe drinking
water and sanitation are also influencing the development of these tech-
nical indicators. The U.N. agencies responsible for monitoring the SDG
water targets are interpreting these targets with human rights principles
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in mind, which illustrates how expertise inertia is being overcome through
a dialogue between two distinct epistemological communities: statisti-
cians and human rights practitioners. A key lesson for advocates is that
policymakers can better understand human rights when these sometimes
nebulous concepts are made more calculable. The inclusion of a human
rights perspective into the SDG monitoring apparatus may enhance state
recognition of the rights to water and sanitation under international law.
At the same time, because certain dimensions, such as water quality, are
more easily measurable than others, such as community participation,
a partial integration could inadvertently distort the meaning of the rights.
As this novel conceptual framework for studying the dynamic
interaction between legal norms and statistics illustrates, quantitative
indicators are like double-edged swords. It is critical to understand exactly
how norms are quantified into technical indicators in order to avoid
unintended knowledge effects and ensure that the information disclosed
reflects the intended goals.
